State of Iowa v. Jabari Lamar Walker, 856 N.W.2d 179

Background

In May 2011 Walker was stopped at an abandoned farm near Cedar Rapids with a female, L.N.; she escaped to a deputy and alleged Walker forced her to perform oral sex and had driven her away from the motel against her will. DNA from L.N. was found on Walker’s penis.
Walker was convicted by a jury of third‑degree kidnapping under Iowa Code § 710.1(3), which requires confinement or removal of a person knowing lack of consent and doing so with the specific intent to subject the person to sexual abuse.
The State sought a sentencing enhancement under Iowa Code chapter 901A (doubling or 25 years if a prior sexually predatory offense exists), treating Walker’s prior Ohio sexual‑imposition conviction and the Iowa kidnapping conviction as qualifying predicate offenses.
The district court denied the enhancement, ruling a finding of intent to commit sexual abuse is not equivalent to a finding of an attempt to commit sexual abuse as required by § 901A.1(1)(e).
The court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Harrington, holding confinement/removal with intent to sexually abuse constitutes an offense involving an attempt to commit sexual abuse. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review on the enhancement issue.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adhered to Harrington, held the jury finding here satisfies the “attempt” requirement for § 901A.1(1)(e), vacated the district court’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing and determination whether Walker’s Ohio conviction qualifies as a prior sexually predatory offense.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Walker's Argument	Held
Whether a jury finding that defendant confined/removed a victim with intent to subject her to sexual abuse constitutes an "offense involving an attempt to commit" sexual abuse under Iowa Code § 901A.1(1)(e)	The jury finding of confinement/removal with specific intent to sexually abuse inherently establishes attempt; thus the conviction is a sexually predatory offense triggering enhancement	A jury finding of intent is not the same as a finding of attempt; intent alone does not satisfy the statute	Court: Yes. Following State v. Harrington, confinement/removal with intent to sexually abuse equates to attempt for § 901A.1(1)(e); Apprendi satisfied because jury found requisite facts beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether Apprendi requires a separate jury finding that defendant attempted sexual abuse before imposing the enhancement	Apprendi requires the underlying facts supporting the enhancement be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt (which occurred here)	(Implicit) Enhancement requires a jury determination of attempt, not just intent element	Court: Apprendi is satisfied — it requires the facts supporting enhancement to be jury‑found; those facts were part of the conviction here
Whether Harrington remains controlling after statutory amendment and Apprendi	Harrington remains applicable; legislature likely viewed prior language as redundant and did not negate Harrington	(Argued in district court) The district court disagreed with Harrington’s reasoning	Court: Harrington controls; legislative amendment did not undermine Harrington and it remains logical under attempt principles
Whether enhancement should be imposed without determining if prior Ohio conviction qualifies	State asks remand to decide predicate status	Walker disputed Ohio conviction as qualifying sexually predatory offense	Court: Remanded for district court to determine whether Walker’s Ohio conviction qualifies as a prior sexually predatory offense before imposing enhancement

Key Cases Cited

State v. Harrington, 608 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2000) (holding false imprisonment or similar confinement with intent to commit sexual abuse constitutes an offense involving an attempt to commit sexual abuse under the enhancement statute)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, other than prior convictions, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2003) (describing Iowa attempt principles: intent plus an act beyond mere preparation)
Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1982) (attempt requires intent and acts in furtherance rendering voluntary termination improbable)
State v. Roby, 188 N.W. 709 (Iowa 1922) (overt acts must approach the consummation of the intended crime; not merely preparatory)