State of Iowa v. George Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783

George Davis pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated (third offense) and received a bargained-for indeterminate sentence (up to five years) on August 24, 2020; the State dismissed related counts and an enhancement.
Davis, while represented by trial counsel, filed a timely pro se notice of appeal (certified by the clerk); trial counsel then moved to withdraw and the appellate defender was appointed.
Iowa Code § 814.6A (2019) bars pro se filings by defendants represented by counsel and directs courts to not consider such filings; the State argued Davis’s pro se notice was therefore a nullity.
Appellate counsel later filed an untimely notice of appeal; the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on jurisdiction and appellate counsel then filed an amended notice acknowledging the earlier pro se filing.
The court treated appellate counsel’s late filing as an application for a delayed appeal, granted it based on Davis’s timely intent to appeal and state-imposed impediments (including § 814.6A and counsel’s duty), and concluded it had jurisdiction.
On the merits Davis claimed denial of allocution at sentencing; the court found the district court gave Davis and counsel multiple opportunities to speak and affirmed the sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a timely pro se notice of appeal filed while the defendant is represented invokes appellate jurisdiction given § 814.6A	State: § 814.6A renders pro se filings by represented defendants null and without legal effect; therefore no timely appeal was initiated	Davis: his pro se notice was timely and should invoke jurisdiction; alternatively § 814.6A is inapplicable or unconstitutional as applied	Court: Even assuming § 814.6A applied, granted delayed appeal. Treated counsel's late notice as application for delayed appeal and found good cause due to Davis's timely expression of intent and state-created impediments; jurisdiction exists
Whether the district court denied Davis the right of allocution at sentencing	State: Court afforded Davis and counsel opportunities to speak; any disorganization did not deny allocution	Davis: District court misunderstood his statements and denied him a real chance to address mitigation	Court: Substantial compliance with rule 2.23(3)(d); Davis had multiple opportunities to speak and the right of allocution was not violated; sentence affirmed

State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402 (Iowa 2021) (held § 814.6A bars pro se supplemental briefs on appeal)
Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779 (Iowa 2021) (upheld a similar statutory bar on pro se filings in postconviction proceedings)
Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (notice of appeal is generally a simple, nonsubstantive act within defendant's prerogative)
Swanson v. State, 406 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1987) (delayed appeal permitted where state action frustrates timely perfection)
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (presume prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance deprived defendant of a timely appeal)
Colwell v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 923 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 2019) (court's inherent power to decide jurisdictional questions)
State v. Duckworth, 597 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 1999) (allocution satisfied by opportunity to speak; substantial compliance suffices)
State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 2001) (no particular formulaic words required to afford allocution)
State v. Craig, 562 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997) (focus is whether defendant had chance to volunteer information helpful to mitigation)