State of Iowa v. Eddie Lamont Virgil
2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 56
| Iowa | 2017Background
- Eddie Virgil was convicted of domestic abuse assault (third offense) for an October 14, 2014 assault on N.J.; conviction carried up to five years with a one-year mandatory minimum.
- The key disputed element was whether Virgil and N.J. were "family or household members" who had "resided together" within the prior year (cohabitation under Iowa Code §§ 708.2A, 236.2).
- Evidence: an 8‑month relationship in 2013–2014; Virgil spent 3–4 nights weekly at N.J.’s home, kept a bag of clothes and a phone there, helped with childcare, but was not on the lease, paid no bills, kept most belongings elsewhere, had no key, and N.J. testified she called them not living together to protect her housing subsidy.
- First jury deadlocked (3 guilty / 9 not guilty); second trial used prior testimony read in as the victim was unavailable; during deliberations the jury asked the court to "Define: Reside + Domestic." The court declined to give a definitional instruction and told jurors to use ordinary meaning and the marshaling instruction.
- Trial counsel never requested the uniform jury instruction (Iowa Crim. Instr. 830.5) explaining the Kellogg cohabitation factors; Virgil raised ineffective‑assistance claim on appeal. The Supreme Court granted further review after the court of appeals affirmed in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to request a jury instruction defining "household member/cohabiting" | State: counsel's omission was an isolated lapse; other preserved issues control | Virgil: counsel should have requested the Kellogg‑based definitional instruction (Iowa Crim. Instr. 830.5) because cohabitation was the central disputed issue | Breach: Yes. Counsel performed below standard by not requesting the definitional instruction and again after jurors asked for guidance |
| Whether Virgil was prejudiced by the omission (Strickland prejudice) | State: evidence of cohabitation was sufficient; no reasonable probability of a different result | Virgil: evidence on cohabitation was equivocal; jurors were confused and could reasonably have doubted cohabitation if instructed on Kellogg factors | Prejudice: Yes. Reasonable probability the outcome would differ if jury had been instructed on cohabitation factors; new trial required |
| Whether the court properly used ordinary meanings rather than the Kellogg factors when jury asked to define "reside"/"domestic" | State: ordinary meaning and marshaling instruction sufficed | Virgil: terms are legal terms of art under the Domestic Abuse Act and required explanation using Kellogg factors | Held: Court erred in failing to give the definitional instruction; ordinary meaning referral was insufficient |
| Admissibility of prior trial testimony (victim unavailable) | State: victim was unavailable and prior testimony admissible | Virgil: challenged unavailability ruling on appeal among other issues | Held: Supreme Court affirmed court of appeals on other preserved issues, including admissibility; ruling on ineffective assistance vacated/case remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 1996) (adopts nonexclusive factors to determine cohabitation under the Domestic Abuse Act)
- Millam v. State, 745 N.W.2d 719 (Iowa 2008) (defines breach of essential duty standard for ineffective assistance)
- Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001) (Strickland framework and counsel diligence principles)
- Soboroff v. State, 798 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011) (counsel ineffective for failing to request a definitional jury instruction despite sufficient evidence on other elements)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes prejudice and deficient performance standards for ineffective assistance)
- Livingood v. Negrete, 547 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 1996) (reaffirms Kellogg principle that mere living together alone does not establish cohabitation)
Decision: Court held counsel was ineffective for failing to request/propose the Kellogg‑based definitional instruction; prejudice shown; conviction reversed and case remanded for a new trial.