State of Iowa v. Dieudonne Manirabaruta
20-0025
| Iowa Ct. App. | Oct 20, 2021Background
- Manirabaruta was charged in June 2019 and entered Alford pleas to second-degree theft and attempted eluding on August 16, 2019. The court advised he must file a motion in arrest of judgment within 45 days (or at least five days before sentencing).
- Sentencing was set for October 15, 2019. On September 17, Manirabaruta filed a pro se letter requesting new counsel and complaining about prior counsel; the letter mentioned an intent to pursue an "arrest of judgment" but only formally asked for new counsel.
- The court granted new counsel on September 20, leaving ten days to file a timely motion in arrest of judgment. On October 15 (the day of sentencing and after 45 days), counsel filed an untimely motion to withdraw plea and a motion in arrest of judgment asserting actual innocence, ineffective advice about immigration consequences, and lack of factual basis for the theft plea.
- The district court declined to consider the October 15 motions as untimely. It also held the September 17 pro se letter was not a motion in arrest of judgment and noted a 2019 statutory change (Iowa Code § 814.6A) bars courts from treating pro se filings by defendants who are represented by counsel.
- After additional post‑plea proceedings and briefing, the district court denied both the motion in arrest of judgment (as untimely) and the motion to withdraw the plea (finding a factual basis existed and deferring ineffective-assistance/immigration claims to postconviction relief if privilege waived).
- On appeal, Manirabaruta argued the September letter was a timely motion in arrest and alternatively that the theft plea lacked a factual basis; the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction/discretionary-review grounds and found no basis to grant appeal.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Manirabaruta's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept. 17 pro se letter constituted a timely motion in arrest of judgment | Letter was not a motion; court properly appointed new counsel and did not err | Letter signaled desire to arrest judgment and should be construed liberally as a motion | Court: Letter was not a motion in arrest of judgment; district court did not err |
| Whether courts may consider pro se filings by a defendant who is represented (effect of §814.6A) | Statute applies; represented defendants cannot file pro se motions (except disqualification) | Statute should not apply to pending cases or when counsel refuses to file requested motion | Court: §814.6A applies to pending criminal cases; defendant was represented, so pro se filing had no effect |
| Whether the denial of motion to withdraw plea was erroneous for lack of factual basis for theft plea | No appeal right shown; factual-basis claim does not establish good cause for direct appeal | Plea lacked factual basis as to knowledge vehicle was stolen, which should permit appeal or withdrawal | Court: Declined to find good cause to allow appeal on factual-basis claim and dismissed appeal; district court’s denial stands |
| Whether the court should grant discretionary review over the motion-in-arrest ruling | Discretionary review unwarranted; claim is effectively ineffective-assistance on direct appeal | Requests discretionary review or permission to appeal the motion-in-arrest ruling | Court: Denied discretionary review; issues amount to ineffective-assistance claims not reviewable on direct appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 2008) (standard of review for denial of motion in arrest of judgment and plea-withdrawal motions)
- Lee v. State, 906 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 2018) (abuse-of-discretion review and definition of untenable reasons)
- Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 2001) (definition of untenable grounds for discretion review)
- Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779 (Iowa 2021) (application of statutes barring certain pro se filings to pending postconviction cases)