State of Iowa v. Darrell Allen Showens, 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 40

Background

Darrell Showens, a registered sex offender (1999 conviction), sat on a bench facing Davenport Public Library about 72 feet from its front door for ~45 minutes on a weekday afternoon.
Deputy Bawden (sex-offender registry officer) observed Showens, confronted him after ~10–20 minutes, and received inconsistent explanations (waiting for friend, scratching tickets, waiting for bus). Showens admitted he knew he was within a football field of the library and that he had prior notice of the exclusion.
Showens was charged under Iowa Code §§ 692A.111(1) and 692A.113(1)(g) for loitering within 300 feet of a public library; trial court found him guilty and imposed jail, fine, and community service.
On appeal Showens argued (1) insufficient evidence he was “loitering” as defined, and (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to challenge the loitering definition as unconstitutionally vague.
The Iowa Supreme Court construed the statute to avoid vagueness: loitering must be tied to an apparently improper purpose (e.g., scouting to locate, lure, harass, or satisfy an unlawful sexual desire), not mere innocuous familiarity.
Because the district court had not applied the clarified standard, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its construction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Showens)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that conduct constituted "loitering" under §692A.113(1)(g)	Facts (45 min., facing library, inconsistent reasons, proximity) support reasonable-person inference that purpose was to locate or become familiar with location of potential victims	Sitting, eating chips, mid-day on school day, plausible benign reasons; State failed to prove predatory purpose beyond reasonable doubt	Reversed: substantial evidence could support conviction, but trial court may not have applied the court’s clarified legal standard; remanded for new findings under that standard
Vagueness challenge to loitering definition (due process)	Statute provides objective reasonable-person test and targets convicted sex offenders in defined areas; not unconstitutionally vague	Definition too subjective and grants unbridled discretion; may criminalize innocent conduct	Statute is saved by construction: interpret loitering to require an apparently improper purpose (scouting/locating/luring/sexual motive); objective reasonable-person test is constitutional under U.S. and Iowa due process
Ineffective assistance for failing to raise vagueness at trial	No showing counsel’s omission caused prejudice because courts can construe statute to be constitutional	Counsel should have raised vagueness; lack of challenge prejudiced Showens	Court rejected need to find counsel ineffective given statute can be reasonably construed; nevertheless reversed on sufficiency-of-evidence grounds and remanded

Key Cases Cited

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality invalidating a loitering ordinance as unconstitutionally vague where it punished remaining "with no apparent purpose")
Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 2009) (Iowa court narrows sex-offender residency statute to avoid vagueness, applying presumption of constitutionality)
State v. Stark, 802 N.W.2d 165 (S.D. 2011) (upholding sex-offender loitering prohibition limited to loitering for the primary purpose of observing or contacting minors)
State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 2006) (discussing void-for-vagueness principles and due process limits on criminal statutes)