State of Iowa v. Dalevonte Davelle Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577

Hearn was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree robbery, second-degree theft, and felony eluding; convictions rested on aiding and abetting the Wal-Mart carjacking.
Delores Morgan’s car was taken in the Davenport Wal-Mart parking lot by two males; Morgan reported the theft and police pursued.
Hearn admitted to police that his brother and cousin were in the Grand Am and testified he was near the Wal-Mart shortly before the carjacking; he denied planning or participating in the carjacking.
The district court found circumstantial evidence—Hearn’s proximity to the scene, his conduct after the carjacking, motive, and knowledge of those in the Grand Am—sufficient to support aiding and abetting robbery and theft.
Hearn was found near the scene on West Kimberly Road, helped obstruct pursuit at one point, and prosecutors argued these acts tied him to the carjacking.
The court of appeals affirmed; the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review to address sufficiency of evidence and the felony-eluding statute interpretation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence tying Hearn to the carjacking	Hearn’s own statements placed him with others in the Grand Am; circumstantial evidence supported aiding and abetting.	Evidence only shows presence near the crime and post-crash actions, not participation.	Substantial evidence supports aiding and abetting robbery and theft.
Whether felony eluding requires ongoing participation in a continuing underlying felony	Hearn participated in a felony carjacking; thus felony eluding applies regardless of withdrawal timing.	If withdrawal occurred before police pursuit, no liability under 702.13 for eluding.	Hearn was participating in a felony at the start of pursuit; eluding conviction affirmed.
Interpretation of 'pursuer' and the scope of 702.13 in felony eluding	Officers chasing contemporaneously from the scene qualify as pursuers; continuous pursuit from the scene is not required.	Pursuers must be in direct, continuous pursuit from the crime scene to impose felony eluding.	Ordinary meaning of pursuer includes pursuing officers responding to the crime, so the eluding statute applies.
Application of the rule of lenity to the eluding statute interpretation	lenity not necessary given plain statutory language and public policy.	Lenity should constrain construction; broad reading could violate notice and due process.	Lenity not invoked to defeat the broad interpretation; statute properly construed to serve public purpose.

State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 2008) (sufficiency review and substantial evidence standard)
State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1984) (evidence viewed in light most favorable; reasonable-doubt standard)
State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 2000) (aiding-and-abetting requires participation or encouragement; knowledge alone is insufficient)
State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa 2005) (participation in public offense; withdrawal from the crime scene governs liability after departure)
State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa 2004) (participation in a public offense; withdrawal from the scene and pursued liability)
State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 2004) (lenity; interpret criminal statutes with strictness and public-policy considerations)
State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 2008) (ambiguity and lenity in statutory interpretation)
Getz, 381 F.Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (continuous pursuit concept in out-of-jurisdiction arrests)