State of Iowa v. Curtis Vance Halverson, 2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 2

Background

Curtis Halverson, housed at the Burlington Residential Correctional Facility (a halfway house), was found with a partially smoked marijuana cigarette; charged under Iowa Code § 719.7 for possession on the grounds of an “institution under the management of the department of corrections.”
At trial the State presented three witnesses who testified the facility operated “under the policies of” the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) and that staff received training associated with IDOC.
Defense counsel moved for directed verdict / judgment of acquittal generally for insufficient evidence but did not specifically argue the facility was not an institution “under the management of” the IDOC.
The jury convicted; the court of appeals affirmed; the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
The Supreme Court examined statutory text (Iowa Code chs. 904, 905), related statutes, and rules of construction to decide whether community-based facilities like the halfway house are managed by the IDOC absent a formal takeover under Iowa Code § 905.9.
The court concluded the halfway house was not under IDOC management as charged, counsel was ineffective for failing to press that specific sufficiency objection, and dismissal was required.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Burlington Residential Correctional Facility is an "institution under the management of the Department of Corrections" for purposes of Iowa Code § 719.7(3)(c)	The State: facility operates under IDOC policies and receives IDOC-associated training; thus it is under IDOC management	Halverson: statutory scheme shows community-based correctional programs are managed by district departments, not the IDOC, absent a formal §905.9 takeover	Held: Facility is not under IDOC management absent an express IDOC assumption of administration under §905.9; State presented no evidence of such a takeover, so element not proved
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to specifically challenge sufficiency on the IDOC-management element	Halverson: counsel failed essential duty by not making the specific statutory sufficiency challenge; prejudice is shown because the charge would have been dismissed	State: failure to specify objection could be tactical or a defensible course; possible amendment might cure defect	Held: Counsel breached essential duty; failure was not reasonable strategy; prejudice shown because a timely specific objection would have required dismissal
Standard of review for ineffective-assistance claim and whether claim may be raised on direct appeal	N/A (parties: apply Strickland and permit direct-appeal review when record adequate)	N/A	Held: Apply Strickland two-prong test; ineffective-assistance claims may be raised on direct appeal when record suffices
Remedy if ineffective assistance shown	Halverson: dismissal of charge because element lacking	State: perhaps amendment could conform information to proof (but concedes no applicable alternative here)	Held: Court vacated court of appeals, reversed district court judgment, remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: performance and prejudice)
State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 2011) (preservation rule for sufficiency challenges and importance of specifying grounds)
State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 2006) (ineffective-assistance claims need not be preserved at trial and may be raised on appeal)
State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 2006) (counsel ineffective when plea or conviction lacked factual basis for statutory element)
State v. Mitchell, 650 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 2002) (statutory interpretation distinguishing what constitutes a correctional institution)
State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1992) (ineffective-assistance claims reviewed de novo)