State of Iowa v. Carrie McIver
2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 6
| Iowa | 2015Background
- Early morning: officer observed pickup stopped in closed-business parking lot; driver left by driving over grass, down sidewalk, and over curb, then weaved within lane—officer initiated traffic stop.
- Driver Carrie McIver displayed slurred speech, failed field sobriety tests, and refused further preliminary breath tests; arrested for improper use of lanes and transported to jail.
- At the jail, deputy requested a breath test under Iowa’s implied-consent statute; McIver refused breath testing and requested blood testing because of prescription medications; deputy declined to administer blood absent submission to breath test; no test given. Three prescription bottles found in her purse.
- McIver was charged with OWI (first offense), moved to suppress (claiming invalid stop and implied-consent violation), trial court denied suppression, and she was convicted on minutes of testimony; she appealed.
- The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed de novo (constitutional issues) and for errors at law (statutory interpretation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of the traffic stop | McIver: stop lacked reasonable suspicion/probable cause; officer’s observations insufficient | State: driving conduct (parking in closed lot, leaving over grass/sidewalk/curb, weaving) supported suspicion of impairment | Stop was valid; totality of circumstances gave reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving |
| Scope of Iowa Code § 321J.6(3) (implied-consent when drugs suspected) | McIver: subsection 3 requires officer to offer a blood or urine test when officer has reasonable grounds to suspect controlled substances or non-alcohol drugs | State: subsection 3 requires driver to submit to blood/urine if officer requests it, but does not mandate the officer to offer those tests | Court: statute ambiguous but legislative history shows subsection 3 requires drivers to submit to blood/urine testing when drugs suspected; it does not impose an affirmative duty on officer to offer blood/urine in every circumstance—here officer was not required to offer blood/urine and denial of suppression was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (traffic stops require reasonable suspicion or probable cause)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable-suspicion analysis uses the totality of the circumstances)
- State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2004) (distinguishes probable cause for arrest from reasonable suspicion for stop)
- State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011) (state constitutional analysis approach)
- Shellady v. Sellers, 208 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 1973) (erratic driving supports investigative stop)
- State v. Bloomer, 618 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 2000) (peace officer determines type of chemical test under implied-consent statute)
- State v. Overbay, 810 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 2012) (implied-consent law aims to protect public safety and eliminate intoxicated driving)
- Bankson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 444 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (permitting urine testing following a below-limit breath test when officer suspects drugs)
