959 N.W.2d 432
Iowa2021Background
- On December 8, 2018 Brian McGee caused a high-speed, left-turn collision; he was rendered unconscious, taken to a hospital, and officers and medics detected a strong odor of marijuana.
- Officer Fricke arranged for a blood draw after an advanced registered nurse practitioner certified McGee was incapable of consent under Iowa Code § 321J.7; no warrant was sought and no attempt was made to obtain one.
- Blood drawn about 4:10 p.m. showed THC, THC metabolites (carboxy-THC), and lorazepam; McGee was charged with first-offense OWI (Iowa Code § 321J.2) under the “any amount of a controlled substance” theory.
- McGee moved to suppress the blood-test results on statutory and constitutional grounds; the district court denied suppression and found statutory compliance with § 321J.7.
- After conviction and sentence, the Iowa Supreme Court evaluated (1) compliance with § 321J.7, (2) Fourth Amendment federal exigency law as articulated in recent U.S. Supreme Court precedents, and (3) whether article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires greater protection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (McGee) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Compliance with Iowa Code § 321J.7 (certification timing) | The certification was valid; the nurse certified incapacity at 3:59 p.m. and the draw at 4:10 p.m. complied with the statute. | The temporary arousal/urination before the draw required a new certification; prior certification was stale. | Court: Blood draw complied with § 321J.7; no recertification required given facts and short interval. (Affirmed as to statute.) |
| 2. Fourth Amendment: Is a warrant required for a blood draw from an unconscious driver suspected of drug impairment? | The State argued Mitchell-style exigency justified the warrantless draw (and the State later asked remand to apply Mitchell). | McGee argued § 321J.7 and the Fourth Amendment do not authorize a warrantless draw absent a warrant or fact-specific exigent circumstances. | Court: Mitchell principles (warrantless draws "almost always" permissible for unconscious drivers with probable cause) extend to suspected drugged driving; but because Mitchell was decided after the suppression hearing, the Court REMANDED for the district court to develop the record under the Mitchell test. |
| 3. Iowa Constitution (article I, § 8): Does Iowa require greater protection than federal law? | The State urged implied-consent statutes suffice; alternatively Mitchell standard should control. | McGee urged Pettijohn and a more protective, usually-warrant-needed state standard. | Court: Article I, § 8 does not demand a standard more protective than the Mitchell plurality; remand under Mitchell will resolve state-constitutional issues. |
| 4. Equal protection: Is treating unconscious drivers differently from conscious drivers unconstitutional? | The State: distinction is rational (conscious drivers can consent/refuse; unconscious drivers cannot). | McGee: differential treatment denies equal protection and fundamental-rights protections. | Court: Rational-basis review applies; statute passes rational basis—no equal-protection violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (no per se exigency for dissipation of alcohol; exigency is fact-specific)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless blood draw upheld on facts where delay would have destroyed evidence)
- State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733 (Iowa 1966) (Iowa precedent upholding warrantless blood draw for unconscious driver where delay threatened destruction of evidence)
- State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2017) (Iowa court applied a generally protective analysis to implied-consent breath tests for boating; warrant ordinarily required under article I, § 8)
- State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2008) (Iowa rejected per se exigency approach; exigency is fact-dependent)
- State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2017) (holding that nonimpairing metabolites may satisfy the "any amount" OWI statutory prong)