State of Iowa v. Brent Alan Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453

On June 14, 2019, Officer Scherle stopped a two-door vehicle for speeding; Deputy Petersen approached the passenger side and interacted with front passenger Brent Hauge and a back-seat female passenger.
A records check revealed the back-seat passenger had an outstanding mittimus/warrant for a domestic-abuse-with-a-weapon conviction; officers asked occupants to exit so they could safely arrest her.
Deputy Petersen told Hauge he was detained; after Hauge exited, Petersen asked if Hauge had weapons and then asked to “check [him] for weapons real quick.” Hauge replied “Yup.”
A pat-down revealed a meth pipe and a baggie of methamphetamine; Hauge was charged with possession (second offense).
Hauge moved to suppress, arguing (1) the exit order violated article I, §8 of the Iowa Constitution (and Fourth Amendment) and (2) his consent to the pat-down was involuntary because he was not told he could refuse. The district court denied suppression; Hauge was convicted and appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officer could order Hauge out of two-door vehicle	Hauge: under Iowa law (Becker) officer may order passenger out only with articulable suspicion of passenger wrongdoing or if needed to facilitate arrest/search; no such suspicion here	State: passenger exit lawful to facilitate safe arrest of back-seat passenger with active warrant; Wilson permits ordering passengers out during stops	Court: Affirmed—even under Becker standard the order was justified to facilitate lawful arrest of back-seat passenger given safety concerns at shoulder of highway
Whether Hauge’s consent to pat-down was voluntary under article I, §8	Hauge: consent involuntary because officer did not advise he could refuse; urges Iowa to adopt a knowing-and-voluntary (Miranda/Johnson-like) rule under state constitution	State: Schneckloth totality-of-the-circumstances governs; no per se duty to warn of right to refuse; facts show voluntary consent	Court: Affirmed—declined to adopt per se warning requirement; retained totality test (Iowa application of Schneckloth/Pals) and found Hauge’s quick, unhesitant consent voluntary under the circumstances

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (police may order passengers out of vehicle during routine traffic stop)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent is a totality-of-the-circumstances question; knowledge of right to refuse is a factor but not required)
State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1990) (passenger may be ordered out only with articulable suspicion of passenger wrongdoing or to facilitate arrest/search)
State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011) (Iowa applies a more searching totality test to consent claims but stopped short of requiring a per se warning)
Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (Ohio approach requiring clear indication person was free to leave before seeking consent; later framed as Schneckloth “with teeth”)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of constitutional trial rights requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings to ensure any waiver is knowing and voluntary)