State of Indiana v. Wallace Irvin Smith, III
71 N.E.3d 368
| Ind. | 2017Background
- In 2000 Wallace I. Smith III pleaded guilty to Class D felony theft and, as part of the plea agreement, expressly agreed he would be “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause.”
- The trial court accepted the plea, entered conviction, and sentenced Smith to one year probation; he was satisfactorily discharged in 2002.
- In 2012 the legislature amended Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 to permit post-sentencing conversions of Class D felonies to Class A misdemeanors upon a verified petition, hearing, and findings.
- In 2015 Smith filed a verified petition under the amended statute seeking conversion of his 2000 Class D conviction to a Class A misdemeanor; the trial court granted the petition over the State’s objection.
- The State appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to decide whether Smith’s plea waiver precluded seeking post-sentencing conversion under the amended statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a plea agreement waiver barring the defendant from “asking for Misdemeanor treatment in this cause” prevents later seeking post-sentencing conversion under amended Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 | Waiver is binding; subsequent statutory change does not erase an unambiguous contractual term | Smith: he could not waive a right that did not exist when he pleaded | Held: Waiver unambiguous; bars Smith from seeking conversion under the amended statute |
| Whether the 2012 amendment to § 35-50-2-7 created a new remedy that falls outside the scope of Smith’s waiver | Amendment did not create a new remedy—only changed timing and procedure | Amendment created a new timing-based right that could not have been waived in 2000 | Held: Amendment procedural only; it grants the same relief and thus falls within the waiver’s scope |
| Whether ambiguities in the plea language require construal against the State (drafter) | State: language is plain and includes conversion requests | Smith: language ambiguous as to future statutory changes | Held: Language not ambiguous; a reasonable person would read it to include conversion petitions |
| Whether public policy or legislative intent prevents enforcement of such waivers | State: legislature has expressly prohibited waiving some post-conviction rights when it intended to; absence of prohibition here permits waiver | Smith: public policy favors allowing courts to reward post-conviction good behavior via conversion | Held: Legislative silence on § 35-50-2-7 waivers means such waivers are permissible; enforcement upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 2004) (plea agreements are contractual)
- Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243 (Ind. 2014) (trial court bound by accepted plea terms; contract interpretation governs)
- State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. 2011) (pre-amendment rule limited conversion to time of sentencing)
- Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing 2012 amendment responded to Brunner and allowed post-sentencing conversion)
- Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2012) (contract interpretation aims to determine parties’ intent)
- Valenzuela v. State, 898 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (ambiguity defined by whether a reasonable person finds multiple interpretations)
- Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809 (Ind. 2016) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)