58 N.E.3d 224
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 2000 Smith pleaded guilty to Class D felony theft and agreed in a plea agreement that he would be “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment.” The court accepted the plea and sentenced Smith to one year probation; probation was discharged in 2002.
- In 2015 Smith petitioned under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (2014) to convert his Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor. The State objected.
- The trial court granted Smith’s petition, vacated the Class D felony conviction, and entered a Class A misdemeanor conviction; the State appealed.
- The parties stipulated Smith met the statutory eligibility criteria in § 35-50-2-7(d); the appellate court directed the trial court to issue findings to that effect.
- The appeal raised two questions: (1) whether § 35-50-2-7(d) could be applied retroactively to permit post‑sentencing conversion, and (2) whether Smith’s plea agreement barred him from seeking such a conversion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Smith) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the trial court had authority to modify a pre‑2014 Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor under Ind. Code § 35‑50‑2‑7(d) | § 35‑50‑2‑7(d) cannot be applied retroactively to disturb convictions/sentences entered years earlier | The 2014 statute (and its 2012 precursor) authorizes post‑sentence petitions to convert Class D felonies to misdemeanors | The statute was intended to permit post‑sentencing conversion; the court had authority to apply § 35‑50‑2‑7(d) to Smith’s conviction (affirmed) |
| 2) Whether plea‑agreement language precluded Smith from seeking misdemeanor conversion | The plea term “precluded from asking for Misdemeanor treatment” bars Smith from petitioning for conversion | The phrase was ambiguous and, when made in 2000, could only have referred to sentencing‑stage relief; it did not contemplate statutory post‑sentencing conversion enacted later | The plea clause was ambiguous and cannot be read to bar relief created after the plea; it did not preclude Smith’s § 35‑50‑2‑7(d) petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Brunner v. State, 947 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. 2011) (held pre‑2012 statute limited conversion authority to sentencing moment)
- Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (interpreting 2012 amendment to allow post‑sentence conversion petitions)
- State v. Pelley, 828 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 2005) (retroactivity presumption: statutes are prospective unless legislature clearly intended otherwise)
- Leeth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
- Valenzuela v. State, 898 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (plea agreements are contractual; contract principles govern interpretation)