State of Indiana v. Tammy Sue Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694

State sought to modify Harper's sentence under Indiana Code 35-38-1-17(b) after 365 days without explicit prosecutorial objection; trial court acknowledged lack of authority but sought prosecutor's assent and suggested modification would proceed if prosecutor did not object.
Prosecutor participated in the January 25, 2013 hearing, indicating consideration of approval; court asked for input “in the near future” and deputy prosecutor agreed to consider.
Prosecutor did not timely respond; on March 5, 2013 the court granted modification and ordered release to probation; State appealed on March 25, 2013.
Indiana Code 35-38-1-17(b) required prosecutorial approval for modifications after 365 days; Fulkrod and related cases guide this rule.
Trial court's modification relied on acquiescence/implicit approval by the prosecutor; court ultimately held that the prosecutor’s conduct satisfied approval under the statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the prosecutor approved the modification.	State argues no approval occurred after 365 days.	Harper contends acquiescence sufficed as approval.	Yes; prosecutor's conduct constituted approval.
Whether the trial court had authority to modify after 365 days without explicit objection.	State contends no authority without explicit approval.	Harper argues lacking authority absent approval.	No error in modification given prosecutor approval.

State v. Fulkrod, 753 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 2001) (prosecutor's approval required after 365 days; court cannot modify without it unless statute grants power previously)
Hawkins v. State, 951 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (acquiescence may impact discretionary modification after 365 days)
Marshall v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (earlier reliance on acquiescence and 365-day framework)
State v. Porter, 729 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (post-365-day modification context)
Dier v. State, 524 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1988) (shock probation concept and timing)