State of Indiana v. Russell Oney
2013 Ind. LEXIS 636
| Ind. | 2013Background
- In 1994 the BMV notified Russell Oney he was a habitual traffic violator (HTV) based on three prior OWI convictions (1986, 1989, 1993), triggering a 10-year suspension; in 1999 Oney was arrested and in 2002 pleaded guilty to operating while suspended as an HTV (Class D felony) and received a three-year sentence and lifetime license revocation.
- In 2010 Oney filed a petition in Fayette County challenging his 1989 OWI conviction; the State did not oppose and the parties entered an Agreed Entry finding "material error," and the Fayette court vacated and expunged the 1989 conviction.
- Oney then moved in Marion County to set aside his 2002 HTV guilty plea, arguing the vacatur of the 1989 predicate conviction removed the basis for his HTV status and that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice under I.C. § 35-35-1-4.
- The Marion trial court (acting in post-conviction capacity) granted the motion and ordered the HTV conviction and suspension vacated; the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.
- The Supreme Court reviewed whether relief is available when an HTV conviction rests on a predicate conviction later set aside for "material error," distinguishing such relief from cases where a predicate is set aside on mere procedural grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Oney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Starks bars collateral relief when an underlying predicate conviction is later set aside | Starks precludes vacating an HTV conviction because the defendant’s status at the time of driving is what matters; subsequent vacatur of a predicate (even if voidable) does not undo the HTV offense | The vacatur of the 1989 OWI was for "material error," removing a predicate and making the HTV plea and judgment voidable, so withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice | Court held Starks does not bar relief where the underlying conviction was set aside for material error (i.e., the offense was not committed) and affirmed trial court grant of relief |
| Whether Oney’s 2002 HTV plea was void or voidable, permitting collateral post-conviction relief | The State argued the 2002 plea was valid in form and not void from inception; collateral relief should be limited per precedent | Oney argued vacatur of a predicate conviction deprived the HTV plea of its factual basis making the HTV judgment voidable and eligible for withdrawal under § 35-35-1-4 | Court held the 2002 HTV conviction was not void but was voidable because a predicate conviction had been vacated for material error, permitting relief under the post-conviction statute |
| Whether the 1989 vacatur qualified as "material error" sufficient to permit attacking the later HTV plea | State did not contest the factual basis for the vacatur but argued Starks foreclosed relief; alternatively, State argued procedural vacaturs do not suffice | Oney relied on the Fayette court’s finding that the 1989 plea was coerced and entered under duress, constituting material error (actual innocence/invalid plea) | Court accepted that the Fayette court’s agreed findings established material error (coercion; no reliable factual basis), enabling collateral attack on the HTV plea |
| Whether the trial court clearly erred in granting withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing | State argued relief was erroneous without trial-level factfinding and reweighing | Oney pointed to the unopposed agreed entry and his verified affidavit supporting the material-error finding | Court held there was sufficient record (agreed entry, affidavit, plea transcripts) for the trial court to grant relief and did not find clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Starks, 816 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 2004) (HTV offense focuses on the fact of HTV status at time of driving; relief available only when underlying offense set aside for material error)
- Harshman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1953) (a guilty plea coupled with a protestation of innocence is not an adequate plea)
- Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. 1983) (trial court may not accept a guilty plea when defendant simultaneously maintains innocence)
- Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. 2000) (a factual basis is required for a guilty plea; pleas accepted while claiming innocence may be invalid)
- State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. 1997) (coercion or misleading by judge/prosecutor/counsel can support collateral claims to set aside a plea)
- Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998) (distinguishing void judgments from voidable judgments; collateral attack permitted for void judgments)
- Olinger v. State, 494 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. 1986) (habitual status-based sentence enhancements must be vacated when an underlying conviction is set aside)
- Coble v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. 1986) (habitual offender enhancements cannot be based on prior convictions later set aside)
- Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. 2001) (trial court rulings on plea-withdrawal motions carry a presumption of correctness)