State of Indiana v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
84 N.E.3d 1230
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2015 Indiana issued 23 citations to Norfolk Southern for permitting trains to obstruct public travel at grade crossings for more than ten minutes under Ind. Code § 8-6-7.5-1. Norfolk conceded the blockings but challenged the citations.
- Norfolk moved for summary judgment arguing Indiana’s blocked‑crossing statute is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Norfolk, concluding the state statute is preempted by both ICCTA and FRSA.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo, treating the record facts as undisputed about typical causes for long blockages (switching, holding for yard entry, mechanical defects) and the operational burdens of cutting trains.
- The Court considered only express preemption and declined to address conflict or field preemption because Norfolk did not develop those arguments.
- The Court reversed the trial court, holding the Indiana statute is not expressly preempted by either the ICCTA or the FRSA and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ICCTA expressly preempts Indiana’s blocked‑crossing law | State: ICCTA does not expressly preempt blocking statutes; silence as to obstruction bars facial preemption | Norfolk: ICCTA’s exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation matters preempts state regulation of crossings | Held: Not expressly preempted — statute falls within states’ police powers and ICCTA lacks explicit preemptive language |
| Whether FRSA expressly preempts Indiana’s blocked‑crossing law | State: FRSA allows state safety laws until federal rule covers the subject; no federal regulation covers crossing block duration | Norfolk: FRSA’s national uniformity goal preempts state laws related to railroad safety | Held: Not expressly preempted — no federal regulation or clear congressional intent to displace states on this issue |
| Whether the blocked‑crossing law is an exercise of state police power (relevance to preemption) | State: Statute regulates public travel safety, a traditional state police power | Norfolk: Regulation of train operations implicates federal interests in rail economics and operations | Held: Court treated the statute as a permissible local police‑power safety regulation not facially barred by ICCTA/FRSA |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on express‑preemption grounds | State: Genuine preemption question exists; trial court erred to grant summary judgment | Norfolk: Record supports that statute conflicts with federal schemes (but declined to brief other preemption theories) | Held: Reversed — summary judgment on express preemption was improper because statutes do not show clear, manifest congressional intent to preempt |
Key Cases Cited
- Kennedy Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 67 N.E.3d 1025 (Ind. 2017) (standard for preemption analysis under Indiana precedent)
- English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (Supreme Court framework for express, field, and conflict preemption)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (look to plain wording of express preemption clauses)
- Adrian & Blissfield R. Co. v. Village of Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2008) (STB and circuit court guidance on ICCTA preemption categories and routine crossing disputes)
- Fayus Enterprises v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ICCTA preemption centers on economic regulation; state police power safety rules preempted only if discriminatory or unduly burdensome)
- Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. State, 743 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (state blocked‑crossing statute not expressly preempted by FRSA)
- Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 278 U.S. 24 (1928) (historic recognition that care of grade crossings is a traditional state police power)