State of Indiana v. Michael E. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21

At midnight, officer stopped Michael Cunningham for a broken/missing taillight; Cunningham asked to exit to inspect it.
Officer granted permission to exit only after stating he would "pat him down for any weapons," and Cunningham agreed and stepped out.
During the frisk officer felt a pill bottle; Cunningham admitted it contained marijuana and later identified a pipe in his truck.
Cunningham was arrested and charged with possession and paraphernalia; he moved to suppress the pill bottle and pipe on grounds the traffic stop was invalid and that his consent to the pat-down was involuntary.
Trial court granted suppression based on an interpretation of the taillight statute; Court of Appeals reversed as to the statute but upheld suppression, finding the conditional pat-down coercive; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.
Indiana Supreme Court reversed the suppression, holding police may condition permission to exit a stopped vehicle on consent to a frisk because the alternative—remaining inside unsearched—preserved a genuine choice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Cunningham)	Held
Validity of stop under taillight statute	Stop valid because two red taillights required for vehicles after 1956	Stop invalid because working bulbs satisfied signaling function	Court summarily affirmed Court of Appeals reversal of trial court; two red taillights required
Whether consent to pat-down was voluntary when conditioned on exiting vehicle	Consent was voluntary because officer could lawfully require driver to stay in vehicle; offering exit-with-frisk left a real choice	Consent was involuntary/coerced because officer had no reasonable suspicion to frisk and conditioned exit on a search	Voluntary: conditional permission to exit subject to a frisk is not inherently coercive; reversal of suppression
Scope of consent after officer felt pill bottle	Pat-down for weapons lawfully allowed touching pockets; defendant voluntarily volunteered contents and pipe, expanding consent	Consent limited to weapons; officer knew object was a pill bottle so further inquiry exceeded scope	Held expansion resulted from defendant’s voluntary disclosures; no coercion or scope violation
Whether officer must inform suspect of right to refuse consent	State: not required; voluntariness judged from totality of circumstances	Defendant: lack of explicit advice of right to refuse negates voluntariness	Held knowledge of right to refuse is a factor but not required; circumstances here showed defendant could avoid search by staying in vehicle

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent judged under totality of circumstances)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer must have reasonable suspicion a person is armed and dangerous to frisk)
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (ordering occupants out of car is a minimal intrusion justified by officer safety)
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (officer safety can justify ordering drivers out of vehicle during traffic stops)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent invalid where subject reasonably believes he has no right to refuse)
Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. 2008) (consent invalid where officer’s statements indicate the search is necessary and not optional)
Jett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (pat-down unreasonable where compliance with an order to remain in car eliminated officer’s safety concern)
McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506 (Ind. 2014) (scope of consensual search defined by object of search; suspect may limit scope)