State of Indiana v. Michael E. Cunningham
4 N.E.3d 800
Ind. Ct. App.2014Background
- Early morning stop of Cunningham for a missing red tail-lens that caused one tail lamp to emit white light; officer Hammock initiated the stop.
- Cunningham asked to exit the vehicle to inspect the lamp; Hammock responded that was fine but he would pat Cunningham down for weapons for officer safety.
- Cunningham exited, said “that was fine,” and submitted to a pat-down; officer felt a pill bottle, Cunningham disclosed it contained marijuana and handed it over.
- After then asking whether there was “anything else,” Cunningham said there was a pipe in his vehicle, retrieved it, and was given Miranda warnings and arrested.
- Trial court granted Cunningham’s motion to suppress, concluding the stop was illegal; the Court of Appeals affirmed suppression but on the alternative ground that the pat-down was not supported and Cunningham’s consent was involuntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of traffic stop | State: stop valid because one tail lamp emitted white light, violating vehicle equipment statute | Cunningham: stop illegal | Court: stop was lawful (vehicle required two red tail lamps under statute) |
| Legality of pat-down/frisk | State: Cunningham consented to pat-down when he exited and said “that was fine” | Cunningham: assent was mere acquiescence to officer’s ultimatum, not voluntary consent | Court: pat-down was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the purported consent was coerced; pat-down invalid |
| Admissibility of evidence found during pat-down | State: items discovered as a result of consensual search are admissible | Cunningham: evidence is fruit of illegal search and must be suppressed | Court: marijuana and pipe suppressed as fruits of illegal pat-down |
| Burden and standard of review on suppression appeal | State: trial court erred and must be reversed if stop and search lawful | Cunningham: suppression should be upheld; consent invalid | Court: gives deference to trial-court facts but reviews constitutionality de novo; affirms suppression based on invalid consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Shipman v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. Ct. App.) (standard of review for motion to suppress)
- Belvedere v. State, 889 N.E.2d 286 (Ind.) (de novo review of constitutional rulings)
- Gonser v. State, 843 N.E.2d 947 (Ind. Ct. App.) (affirm where any legal theory supports suppression ruling)
- Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.) (reasonable suspicion required for traffic stop)
- Freeman v. State, 904 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. Ct. App.) (statute requires two red tail lamps; stop justified for burned-out tail lamp)
- Kroft v. State, 992 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App.) (interpretation of tail lamp statute)
- Hill v. State, 956 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. Ct. App.) (frisk requires reasonable suspicion that person is armed and dangerous)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (U.S.) (no automatic frisk of vehicle occupants absent reasonable suspicion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S.) (frisk standard: more than an unparticularized hunch)
- Nowling v. State, 955 N.E.2d 854 (Ind. Ct. App.) (State bears burden to prove consent was voluntary)
- Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App.) (verbal assent must reflect uncoerced, knowing election)
- Jorgensen v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App.) (mere acquiescence to claim of right to search is not consent)
- Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind.) (officer may order occupant out of vehicle, but frisk not automatic)
- Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (U.S.) (traffic stop does not automatically justify a search)