State of Indiana v. John B. Larkin
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 239
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2012 John Larkin was charged with voluntary manslaughter after his wife Stacey was found shot; police conducted multiple interviews and recorded privileged communications between Larkin and his counsel. The recording was transcribed and circulated in the prosecutor’s office. Evidence (a safe’s door) also arrived to defense expert damaged after State handling.
- Larkin moved to disqualify the LaPorte County Prosecutor’s Office; the trial court denied the motion, and Larkin sought interlocutory appellate review (Larkin I), which led to a certified opinion and procedural ripple effects.
- Multiple prosecutors withdrew/recused; a special prosecutor and several judges were appointed/recused, producing delays and contested attribution of those delays under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) (speedy-trial rule).
- Larkin moved for discharge under Rule 4(C) (claiming the State missed the agreed 90-day trial window after Nov. 5, 2014) and alternatively moved to dismiss for inability to obtain a fair trial given State and law-enforcement misconduct (eavesdropping on attorney-client communications, dissemination of transcript, alleged witness tampering attempts, and evidence tampering).
- The trial court granted both discharge and dismissal; the State appealed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding Rule 4(C) time had expired and that cumulative prosecutorial and law-enforcement misconduct denied Larkin a fair trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Larkin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in granting discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) | The Rule 4(C) period was tolled by interlocutory appeal and did not expire before April 7, 2016; any post-appeal scheduling or conduct shows the State resumed prosecution and did not waive time. | The interlocutory appeal delay and subsequent judicial/prosecutorial conflicts and misconduct are chargeable to the Rule 4(C) clock; even if some tolling occurred, the clock had run by late March 2016. | Affirmed discharge: court concluded, on the unique facts, interlocutory appeal delay was charged to Larkin through Oct. 6, 2015 and that subsequent periods of delay (including judge-selection and recusal issues) were chargeable such that the Rule 4(C) period expired March 26, 2016. |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charge because Larkin could not receive a fair trial | The State: presumption of prejudice from eavesdropping is rebuttable and it should have had an opportunity (Taylor hearing) to disprove prejudice; dismissal was too extreme. | Larkin: misconduct extended beyond eavesdropping (recording privileged communications, transcription and dissemination, inconsistent prosecutor affidavits, attempted witness tampering, and evidence tampering) and undermined any possibility of a fair, untainted prosecution. | Affirmed dismissal: the court found cumulative misconduct (bad faith and deliberate breaches) so severe that it could not guarantee a fair trial; dismissal was within trial court’s discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2009) (interlocutory appeals that lead to a stay remove the trial court’s ability to proceed and ordinarily toll Rule 4(C) timing)
- Harrington v. State, 588 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (delay caused by prosecutor conflict can be charged to the Rule 4(C) period so a defendant is not forced to choose between a fair trial and a speedy trial)
- State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019 (Ind. 2016) (eavesdropping on attorney-client communications creates a presumption of prejudice; the State may rebut prejudice regarding testimonial evidence only beyond a reasonable doubt and must be afforded opportunity to do so)
- State v. Schmitt, 915 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (trial court has broad discretion to sanction the State for discovery violations, including dismissal when misconduct is deliberate and substantially prejudicial)
- Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant generally charged with delay caused by his continuance requests but not when defense acts were necessary to secure a fair trial due to State failures)
- Grow v. State, 263 N.E.2d 277 (Ind. 1970) (delay resulting from defendant’s motions, including change-of-judge motions, is normally chargeable to the defendant)