56 N.E.3d 1187
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- Dr. John K. Sturman, an Indiana-licensed pain-management physician, prescribed numerous controlled substances to patients between 2009–2012; three patients (D.E.H., M.K.C., T.A.V.) later died with those prescribed drugs present in toxic amounts. Experts opined the prescriptions were without legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of practice.
- The State charged Sturman with three counts of reckless homicide (Class C felonies) and sixteen counts of issuing invalid prescriptions (Class D felonies). The Information alleged date ranges and drugs for each count; a supporting probable-cause affidavit provided more specific prescription dates and expert opinions.
- Sturman moved to dismiss all counts on multiple grounds: failure to state offenses with sufficient certainty (risking non-unanimous juries and double jeopardy), statute-of-limitations bar for certain counts, and vagueness of the statutory phrase “legitimate medical purpose.”
- The trial court dismissed Counts 1–3 (reckless homicide) for failure to state an offense and dismissed Count 1 and several prescription counts as time-barred or overlapping the statute of limitations, but allowed amendment of some prescription counts and denied the vagueness challenge.
- The State appealed the dismissals of the homicide counts; Sturman cross-appealed the denial of his motions to dismiss other counts and the vagueness ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sturman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Counts 1–3 (reckless homicide) were facially deficient for failing to allege causation | Information + affidavit sufficiently alleged that decedents died after ingesting controlled substances prescribed by Sturman; causation is a factual issue for trial | Writing prescriptions alone cannot cause death; State must plead but-for causation (relying on Burrage) | Reversed trial court: Counts 1–3 sufficiently alleged reckless homicide; dismissal for failure to state offense was an abuse of discretion |
| Whether Count 1 (reckless homicide re: D.E.H.) was barred by the 5-year statute of limitations | Statute of limitations for reckless homicide begins when death occurs (crime completes upon death); filing was timely (filed one day before 5-year mark from death) | Statute begins when the injurious act (last prescription) occurred; thus prosecution was untimely | Reversed trial court: limitations period begins upon victim’s death; Count 1 was timely |
| Whether Counts 1–6 and 8–19 failed to state offenses with sufficient certainty (jury unanimity / double jeopardy concerns) | The Information identified victims, drugs, and time frames; the affidavit provides specific dates; State may present alternative theories or designate specific acts at trial | Alleging drug lists and broad date ranges permits non-unanimous verdicts and later successive prosecutions | Affirmed in part: trial court did not abuse discretion in denying dismissal; State may need to designate specific acts or the jury must unanimously agree on the same act(s); amendments required for some counts to cure statute-of-limit problems |
| Whether I.C. §16-42-19-20 (prohibiting issuing an invalid prescription not for a "legitimate medical purpose") is unconstitutionally vague | Phrase refers to standards of medical practice ascertainable via medical community, treatises, and expert testimony; statute parallels federal CSA standards; not vague | "Legitimate medical purpose" is undefined, fails to give notice, and invites arbitrary enforcement by prosecutors/juries | Affirmed: statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; adequate notice exists through accepted medical standards and expert evidence, and arbitrary enforcement concerns are speculative |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (Supreme Court held death-enhancement requires but-for causation where drug was not an independently sufficient cause)
- Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. 2011) (State may plead multiple acts over a period but must ensure jury unanimity or designate the specific act(s) proving each count)
- Griffin v. State, 439 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1982) (information must give sufficient notice of the charge to allow defense and to prevent subsequent prosecution for the same conduct)
- United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (federal CSA language limiting prescription defenses to legitimate medical purpose/usual course of practice is not void for vagueness)
- Illinois v. Mudd, 507 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (statute of limitations for reckless homicide begins when death occurs because death is an element completing the crime)