State of Indiana v. Douglas Woods Johnston
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 448
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Johnston, convicted twice of Child Molesting (1997 and 2006), filed a petition under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22 seeking removal/less restrictive SORA registration requirements, citing his 2006 GBMI finding, age (59), disability, and mental health treatment needs.
- The petition omitted one conviction, was not submitted under penalties of perjury, and did not assert ex post facto claims or identify a statutory basis for relief under § 11-8-8-22(g).
- A hearing was held; the State appeared and objected that the petition was procedurally deficient and Johnston had not met his burden of proof. Testimony focused on Johnston’s mental health and hardships from registration, not on statutory grounds for relief.
- The trial court ordered that Johnston be required to register only until July 28, 2016 (ten years after the 2006 conviction). The DOC moved to intervene and to correct error; the trial court denied the motion to correct error after the DOC failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
- The Court of Appeals found Johnston was likely subject to lifetime registration (multiple convictions and victim age) and held the petition and process were legally inadequate under SORA; it reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice so Johnston may file a sufficient petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court properly granted relief under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22 despite petition defects | Johnston argued substantial compliance and that the court implicitly found an ex post facto problem; emphasized GBMI status and hardship | State (and DOC) argued the petition failed statutory requirements (not sworn, omitted conviction, no notice) and should have been dismissed | Court held petition was inadequate; trial court erred by granting relief and denying motion to correct error — reversal and remand to dismiss without prejudice |
| Whether trial court made required § 11-8-8-22(g) findings (change in law or ex post facto basis) | Johnston suggested relief could be justified implicitly | State argued no statutory basis was developed or proven at hearing | Court held there were no required findings or statutory development; relief could not be granted on compassionate grounds alone |
| Whether procedural notice requirements and burden of proof were satisfied | Johnston relied on State counsel’s presence at hearing as substantial compliance | State argued § 11-8-8-22(k)/(e) notice to DOC/AG/prosecutors and sworn petition were mandatory | Court found notice and petition defects significant; attendance by a prosecutor did not cure statutory deficiencies |
| Appropriate remedy if Flanders-type ex post facto claim existed | Johnston pointed to Flanders to suggest constitutional relief might support his petition | State noted Johnston made no ex post facto argument below | Court noted even a successful Flanders-type claim would not justify immediate termination at ten years but periodic post-ten-year review; Johnston made no such argument, so remedy was dismissal and leave to refile |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (standard of review for motion to correct error and when de novo review applies to legal questions)
- In re Ohio Conviction against Gambler, 939 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (petition to remove from SORA that failed statutory form/notice must not support relief)
- Flanders v. State, 955 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (ex post facto challenge to SORA amendment can entitle petitioner to renewed post-ten-year review rather than immediate termination of registration)