State of Indiana v. Brian J. Taylor
2016 Ind. LEXIS 226
Ind.2016Background
- Police arrested Brian Taylor and he refused to waive counsel; his attorney David Payne arrived and met Taylor in an interview room. An audio feed of that privileged attorney-client conversation was routed to a separate "War Room," where prosecutors and detectives listened and learned, among other things, the handgun’s location.
- Prosecutor Neary later disclosed the eavesdropping, reported the discovery of the gun (which detectives nevertheless retrieved), and self-referred to the disciplinary commission; the State stipulated suppression of the handgun as derived from the eavesdropping.
- Taylor deposed multiple officers about the eavesdropping; five officers invoked the Fifth Amendment in those depositions and additional officers likewise invoked the Fifth at a suppression hearing, blocking disclosure of who listened and what was overheard.
- Taylor moved to suppress all evidence and to bar testimony by any witness who asserted the Fifth concerning the eavesdropping; the trial court found independent sources for many physical exhibits but ordered blanket suppression of testimony from any witness who had invoked the Fifth.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the blanket pretrial testimonial exclusion; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to decide the proper remedial rule when police eavesdrop on privileged communications and witnesses invoke the Fifth.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether law-enforcement eavesdropping on attorney-client communications requires blanket pretrial suppression of any witness who later invokes the Fifth | The eavesdropping and subsequent Fifth invocation frustrate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment confrontation and warrant barring such witnesses from testifying | Blanket suppression is extreme; some officer testimony may be untainted and necessary to lay foundation for independent evidence | Blanket pretrial suppression is premature; presumptive taint arises but is rebuttable |
| Who bears the burden to show testimonial evidence is untainted, and by what standard | Taylor: State’s misconduct presumptively prejudicial; State should not be allowed to use tainted evidence | State: can show independent sources for particular evidence; blanket exclusion is overbroad | The State bears the burden to disprove testimonial taint beyond a reasonable doubt for each presumptively tainted witness/testimony |
| Whether independent-source findings for tangible evidence negate the need for excluding related officer testimony | Taylor: independent-source findings for exhibits do not cure testimonial taint about strategy or who heard what | State: testimony limited to routine, foundational matters may be untainted despite eavesdropping | Independent-source findings for exhibits do not automatically cleanse officer testimony; limited foundational testimony may be allowed if State proves no taint beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether prosecutorial misconduct claim independently requires relief now | Taylor: prosecutor’s participation aggravated prejudice and warrants relief | State: relief depends on whether tainted evidence/testimony reaches the jury; not inevitable | Court declined to decide misconduct remedy now; resolution depends on whether State meets heavy burden to disprove taint |
Key Cases Cited
- Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (no irrebuttable presumption of prejudice from undercover attendance on attorney-client meeting where no tainted evidence was used)
- Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (independent-source and inevitable-discovery principles for excluding unlawfully obtained physical evidence)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (remedies must neutralize constitutional taint without granting windfalls to defendants)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (confrontation right centers on effective cross-examination)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (confrontation and cross-examination to test witness truthfulness)
- Gouveia v. United States, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at initiation of formal proceedings)
- Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 2003) (refusal to presume prejudice where unlawfully seized material played no role at trial)
- Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. 1991) (harmless-error standard: constitutional error must be shown harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 2013) (exclusionary-rule principles for unlawfully obtained physical evidence)
- State v. Fuentes, 318 P.3d 257 (Wash. 2014) (in similar eavesdropping facts, trial court must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut presumption of testimonial taint)