180 So. 3d 1099
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Depriest was charged with vehicular homicide after a head-on collision on a two-lane, undivided rural highway that killed the other driver.
- Posted speed limit was 55 mph; investigator estimated both vehicles were traveling about 55 mph at impact.
- After passing a slower van in a legal passing zone, Depriest remained in the northbound lane (i.e., the wrong lane) for approximately one-half mile.
- A witness passed the same van, returned to the correct lane, and observed Depriest still in the opposite lane; the witness saw the victim’s headlights and said Depriest took no evasive action.
- Depriest told police he did not see the oncoming vehicle and stayed in the opposite lane to avoid future passing maneuvers; the trial court excluded that statement by motion in limine but agreed to consider it for the dismissal motion.
- Depriest moved to dismiss under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4) arguing his actions did not rise to the recklessness/willful-and-wanton standard required for vehicular homicide; the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether undisputed facts establish a prima facie case of vehicular homicide (willful/wanton reckless driving) | State: driving a half-mile in the wrong lane at highway speeds while capable of returning to lane is willful/wanton disregard and supports submission to a jury | Depriest: conduct was not willful/wanton reckless driving (at most negligence); did not foresee the fatal outcome | Court reversed dismissal: undisputed facts suffice to establish a prima facie case of vehicular homicide and should go to a jury |
| Proper standard on a 3.190(c)(4) motion | State: court must determine if undisputed facts would permit a reasonable jury to find the offense | Depriest: facts here insufficient as a matter of law | Court applied de novo review and the standard that the State must show conduct at least constituting reckless (willful/wanton) driving |
| Definition/application of "willful" and "wanton" in vehicular homicide | State: definitions permit finding that knowingly driving wrong-way for extended distance is conscious indifference to likely harm | Depriest: absence of specific foresight or only brief conduct precludes willful/wanton finding | Court relied on jury instruction definitions and precedent: reasonable jurors could find willful/wanton conduct here |
| Whether excluding/applying Depriest’s statement affected the ruling | State: court may consider undisputed statement for the motion despite in limine exclusion | Depriest: statement excluded but court treated it as undisputed for motion | Court considered the statement for purposes of the 3.190 motion and still found a prima facie case |
Key Cases Cited
- Bonge v. State, 53 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (purpose and standard of rule 3.190(c)(4) dismissal motion)
- Cahours v. State, 147 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (state must show conduct at least sufficient to constitute reckless driving for vehicular homicide)
- W.E.B. v. State, 553 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (willful/wanton described as conscious indifference; foreseeability of general type of harm)
- Lowe v. State, 40 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (3.190(c)(4) motion standard cited)
- State v. Walthour, 876 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (3.190(c)(4) motion purpose)
- State v. Sholl, 18 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (de novo review for legal questions on dismissal)
- Sexton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (comparative authority on vehicular homicide/recklessness)
- Miller v. State, 75 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1954) (older precedent addressing negligence versus recklessness in driving cases)