186 So. 3d 1013
Fla.2016Background
- Robert Franklin Floyd was convicted of second-degree murder and shooting into an occupied vehicle after he shot at a car that had passengers Getyron Benjamin and Gerald Banton; Floyd claimed self-defense and defense of others.
- Disputed facts included who fired first, whether Benjamin and Banton were retreating, and whether Floyd was the initial aggressor after an altercation at Floyd’s party.
- The trial court instructed the jury using Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.6(f) (justifiable use of deadly force / Stand Your Ground) with agreed modifications; defense counsel expressly reviewed and approved the final charge and made no contemporaneous objection.
- On appeal, Floyd argued for the first time that Instruction 3.6(f) was internally contradictory regarding the duty to retreat when the defendant may have been the initial aggressor; the First District found the instruction contradictory and that the error was fundamental, reversed convictions, and ordered a new trial.
- The State sought review; the Florida Supreme Court accepted certification of whether the standard instruction is confusing, contradictory, or misleading about the duty to retreat when initial aggressor status is in dispute.
- The Supreme Court reviewed statutory law (chapter 776) and prior precedent, concluded the instruction correctly states the law and is not confusing or contradictory, quashed the district court decision, and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) is confusing/contradictory re: duty to retreat when initial-aggressor status is disputed | Instruction language conflicts between Stand Your Ground (no duty to retreat) and initial-aggressor exception, thereby negating self-defense | Instruction correctly mirrors statutory scheme: Stand Your Ground applies generally, initial-aggressor exception applies only if defendant provoked the force and then failed to meet statutory exceptions | Court held the instruction accurately states the law and is not confusing or contradictory; answered certified question in the negative |
| Whether the alleged instructional error constituted fundamental error warranting reversal despite no contemporaneous objection | Conflicting instructions undermined sole defense (self-defense), so error was fundamental | No contemporaneous objection; defense counsel approved and helped tailor the instruction, showing no perceived confusion; instruction mirrors statute and precedent | Court emphasized counsel’s approval and found no fundamental error because the instruction properly guided jury on multiple factual findings required by law |
| Whether the initial aggressor exception is properly conveyed by the ‘‘exhausted every reasonable means to escape’’ language in the instruction | That language conflicts with Stand Your Ground phrasing and creates ambiguity about duty to retreat | The statutory language and instruction place the ‘‘every reasonable means’’ requirement squarely within the initial-aggressor exception | Held that the ‘‘every reasonable means’’ language only applies if the jury finds the defendant was the initial aggressor, and the instruction communicates that correctly |
| Whether trial court should have given different organization or additional clarifying instructions | Organization rendered instruction confusing; trial court should have reworded or reordered components | Multiple valid ways to organize complex self-defense law exist; trial judge and counsel may modify instructions as needed; here counsel accepted wording | Court held organizational choices were permissible and not misleading; trial judge retains responsibility to tailor instructions but no error here |
Key Cases Cited
- Butler v. State, 493 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1986) (trial courts must avoid confusing or misleading instructions)
- Perriman v. State, 731 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1999) (clarity is the yardstick for jury instructions)
- State v. Bryan, 287 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1973) (instructions need be sufficient, not academically perfect)
- Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003) (standard jury instructions enjoy presumption of correctness)
- Daniels v. State, 121 So. 3d 409 (Fla. 2013) (questions of law reviewed de novo)
- Wyche v. State, 170 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (upholding standard instruction when initial-aggressor status disputed)
- Sims v. State, 140 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining necessity of instructing jury on duty to retreat if defendant is initial aggressor)
- Yohn v. State, 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985) (trial judge retains responsibility to properly charge the jury despite available model instructions)