State of Florida v. Daryl Miller
227 So. 3d 562
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Daryl Miller was charged under § 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, for driving after revocation as a habitual traffic offender; he moved to dismiss, asserting he never possessed a Florida driver license.
- The trial court granted the motion and reduced the charge to driving without a valid license; the State appealed.
- The Third District affirmed, adopting the First District’s reasoning in Crain v. State, and certified conflict with Second, Fourth, and Fifth District decisions (Carroll, Newton, Bletcher).
- The Florida Supreme Court reviewed whether possession of a Florida driver license is a necessary element of a § 322.34(5) offense.
- The Court analyzed the statutory text, definitions (including § 322.01(17) defining “driver license”), and related provisions, concluding the statute applies only to persons whose Florida license was revoked.
- The majority approved the Third District and disapproved conflicting district-court precedent to the extent inconsistent; Justice Canady dissented as the case was moot by plea agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 322.34(5) requires prior possession of a Florida driver license (i.e., is revocation of an existing license an element) | Miller: cannot be convicted under § 322.34(5) because he never had a Florida license to be revoked | State: "driver license" should be read to cover driving privilege and thus reach unlicensed drivers; other Chapter 322 provisions show interchangeable usage | Held: Yes. § 322.34(5) requires a prior Florida driver license; person who never held a license cannot be charged under § 322.34(5) |
| Whether § 322.34(5) is ambiguous such that other Chapter 322 provisions should be construed in pari materia to broaden its scope | Miller: statute is plain and unambiguous; referential construction unnecessary | State: context of Chapter 322 shows terms like "driver license" and "driving privilege" overlap; statute should be construed to include unlicensed drivers | Held: Statute is unambiguous; canons (in pari materia, expressio unius, avoid surplusage) favor narrow reading limited to revoked license holders |
| Whether legislative intent supports enhanced penalties for multiple violations by never-licensed drivers | Miller: Legislature provided enhanced penalties only for revoked licensees; did not extend to never-licensed drivers | State: argued policy favors broad deterrence and prior practice of charging under driving-privilege provisions | Held: Legislative text and structure show enhanced felony in § 322.34(5) applies only to revoked license holders; other statutes expressly reach unlicensed drivers when intended |
| Whether the case should be dismissed as moot because State agreed not to prosecute § 322.34(5) against Miller | State: proceeded with merits; sought resolution to resolve district conflict | Miller (dissent viewpoint): plea agreement renders case moot and advisory; should be dismissed | Held (majority): reached merits and resolved conflict; dissent would dismiss as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Crain v. State, 79 So.3d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (held possession of a Florida license is prerequisite for § 322.34(5))
- Carroll v. State, 761 So.2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (contrary district decision on scope of § 322.34(5))
- Newton v. State, 898 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (contrary district decision on scope of § 322.34(5))
- State v. Bletcher, 763 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 6th DCA 2000) (contrary district decision on scope of § 322.34(5))
- Daniels v. Fla. Dept. of Health, 898 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2006) (statutory interpretation: use plain meaning when statute is unambiguous)
- Polite v. State, 973 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 2007) (standard of review for statutory construction)
- Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189 (Fla. 2007) (avoid treating statutory words as surplusage)
- Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976) (expressio unius canon supporting exclusion when Legislature omitted language)