State of Florida v. Cedric Plummer
228 So. 3d 661
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Appellee Cedric Plummer was convicted of attempted armed robbery (Count I) and robbery with a non-deadly weapon (Count II) after a convenience-store robbery in which the State introduced a plastic gun the officer identified as a BB gun.
- At trial Sergeant Pearson testified the item “turned out to be” a BB gun based on appearance; defense cross-examination and closing emphasized uncertainty about what the object was.
- Trial counsel argued the jury should not assume the object was a weapon but did not retain an expert or otherwise investigate the exact type and capabilities of the device.
- On postconviction review (Rule 3.850), Plummer presented ballistics consultant Josh Wright who concluded the item was an airsoft gun (plastic pellets, lower velocity) and opined it was not a weapon capable of death or serious bodily harm under the jury instruction definition, except possibly by direct ocular impact.
- The trial court found counsel deficient for failing to investigate/present expert evidence distinguishing an airsoft gun from a BB gun and concluded prejudice existed as a reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict on the weapon-enhanced robbery count (Count II); it granted a new trial on that count.
- The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, applying Strickland and concluding trial counsel’s failure deprived the jury of material evidence on whether the device qualified as a “weapon” and undermined confidence in the verdict as to Count II.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Plummer) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate/retain an expert to identify the device | Counsel was deficient for not determining the gun was an airsoft pistol and for failing to present expert testimony that it could not cause death or serious bodily harm | Trial counsel reasonably pursued a strategy of emphasizing uncertainty and relied on lay descriptions; cross-examination and closing sufficiently challenged the officer’s testimony | Held: Counsel was deficient — trial court credited expert testimony that an airsoft gun differs materially from a BB gun and that defense lacked expert evidence at trial |
| Whether Plummer demonstrated Strickland prejudice from that deficiency | Expert testimony would likely have persuaded a reasonable juror that the device was not a “weapon” under the jury instruction, undermining confidence in the Count II verdict | Even Plummer’s expert admitted direct hits to the eye could cause blindness or hospital-level injury,so a new expert would not likely have changed the verdict | Held: Prejudice shown — the court concluded a reasonable probability exists that the outcome on the weapon-enhanced count would differ, so a new trial on Count II is warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing deficient-performance and prejudice standard for ineffective assistance)
- Johnston v. State, 70 So.3d 472 (Fla. 2011) (standard for evaluating counsel performance and strategic decision deference)
- Pennington v. State, 34 So.3d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (avoid hindsight; evaluate counsel from perspective at the time)
- Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2001) (requirement that no competent counsel would have taken the action)
- Simmons v. State, 105 So.3d 475 (Fla. 2012) (definition of reasonable probability for Strickland prejudice)
- Reynolds v. State, 99 So.3d 459 (Fla. 2012) (standard of review for postconviction factual findings and de novo review of law application)
- Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1997) (confirming jury-instruction definition of “weapon” as any object that could cause death or inflict serious bodily harm)
