STATE OF FLORIDA v. BRYANT MOSS, 21-0347

On Dec. 24, 2019, Moss ran a stop sign; officer arrested him for driving while license suspended (DWLS).
Official police/booking records and the State’s driver record showed three prior DWLS convictions; the charging information alleged only one prior.
The Legislature amended § 322.34 effective Oct. 1, 2019, to require a minimum 10-day jail term for a third or subsequent DWLS conviction.
Moss entered an open no-contest plea after the court promised adjudication and court costs; the State objected to omission of the mandatory 10-day term.
The trial court adjudicated guilt but declined to impose the mandatory 10-day jail term, concluding its application would be ex post facto and noting the information listed only one prior.
The State appealed; the district court reviewed the legality of the sentence de novo and reversed, remanding for further proceedings and opportunity to withdraw the plea.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Moss)	Held
Whether the § 322.34(2)(b)2 mandatory 10-day jail term applies to Moss’s Dec. 24, 2019 conviction (ex post facto challenge)	Statute applies to Moss because the current (post‑Oct.1,2019) offense triggered increased penalty for recidivism	Application would be an ex post facto increase in punishment based on prior convictions occurring before the amendment	Reversed: amendment is a permissible recidivist sentencing enhancement, not an ex post facto enactment; mandatory 10 days required
Whether failure to allege two prior DWLS convictions in the information denied Moss due process / convicted him of an uncharged greater offense	Prior convictions affect only penalty, not the offense element; they need not be pleaded to impose enhanced misdemeanor penalty	Conviction or enhanced penalty not properly charged because information listed only one prior (citing Keels)	Held that prior convictions affecting only sentencing are not essential elements; no fundamental error in imposing the statutory mandatory term; Moss received adequate notice of law

Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) (recidivist enhancements increase penalty for the later offense and are not ex post facto when prior convictions predate the enhancement)
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (recidivism-based enhanced sentencing does not violate ex post facto principles)
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (enhanced penalty for subsequent offense is not an additional punishment for earlier crime)
Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing federal precedents that recidivist enhancements are not ex post facto)
Haddix v. State, 668 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (prior convictions that affect only penalty need not be alleged in the charging document)
Keels v. State, 792 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (conviction for an offense greater than charged is fundamental error)
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (ex post facto law defined as retrospective change that increases punishment)
Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1996) (defendant must be allowed to withdraw plea if it was induced by an incorrect sentencing promise)