State of Florida v. Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr.
160 So. 3d 393
| Fla. | 2015Background
- Anthony Horsley (17 in 2006) convicted of first-degree felony murder and related offenses; trial court sentenced him to life without parole (LWOP) under Florida’s pre-2014 mandatory scheme.
- Miller v. Alabama (2012) held mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional because sentencers must consider youth-related mitigating factors. Horsley’s sentence was therefore unconstitutional as applied.
- Florida Legislature enacted chapter 2014-220 (codified at §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Fla. Stat.), effective July 1, 2014, requiring individualized sentencing hearings for juveniles and providing structured term-of-years alternatives and later judicial review.
- Question presented: what remedy should apply to juvenile offenders (like Horsley) whose offenses predate July 1, 2014 but whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller?
- Fifth DCA adopted a “statutory revival” approach (reviving the pre-1994 parole-eligible statute). The Florida Supreme Court granted review and considered the Legislature’s 2014 enactment in deciding the appropriate remedy.
Issues and Key Cases Cited
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Is Florida’s mandatory LWOP sentencing for juveniles constitutional? | Horsley: mandatory LWOP violates Miller because it precludes individualized consideration. | State: concedes Miller applies; disputes remedy scope. | Held: Mandatory LWOP (pre-2014 statute) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. |
| 2) Should the Court apply chapter 2014-220 (the new juvenile sentencing statute) retroactively to pre‑July 1, 2014 juvenile sentences? | Horsley: apply the 2014 statute to provide individualized hearings and review consistent with Miller. | State: argues Savings Clause and statutory limits prevent retroactive application. | Held: Apply chapter 2014-220 to all juvenile offenders whose sentences violate Miller (Savings Clause not a barrier where prior statute is unconstitutional; federal supremacy controls). |
| 3) Is “statutory revival” (reviving the pre-1994 parole-eligible statute) the proper remedy? | Horsley: revival is improper because Legislature later enacted a different remedial scheme. | State/Fifth DCA: revive pre-1994 statute to provide parole eligibility (or use revived statute as default). | Held: Reject statutory revival—inconsistent with legislature’s explicit remedial choice and with modern abolition of parole; revival would rewrite statute. |
| 4) What sentencing procedure should the trial court follow on remand for Horsley? | Horsley: trial court must conduct individualized Miller hearing and may impose a term of years. | State: trial court must conduct individualized hearing; argued LWOP remains an option if justified. | Held: Remand for resentencing under chapter 2014-220: conduct individualized hearing (per § 921.1401); because facts show Horsley ‘‘actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill,’’ impose life if court finds appropriate, otherwise at least 40 years; sentence-review available after 25 years absent disqualifying prior convictions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders; sentencer must consider youth-related factors)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders prohibited; states must provide meaningful opportunity for release)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders; juveniles are constitutionally different)
- Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2005) (retroactivity principles for new constitutional rules in Florida)
- Castle v. State, 330 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976) (Savings Clause purpose: statute at time of offense governs punishment, absent constitutional infirmity)
- B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994) (doctrine and limits of statutory revival)
- Partlow v. State, 134 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (advocated statutory revival to pre-1994 parole-eligible regime for juveniles)
- Toye v. State, 133 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (discussed remedy approaches post-Miller; dissenting/concurrent opinions favor revival)