State of Delaware v. Brittany Anderson
1611018151
| Del. Ct. Com. Pl. | Aug 9, 2017Background
- Defendant Brittany A. Anderson was charged with DUI, failure to remain in a single lane, and possession of marijuana following an arrest on November 28, 2016. Trial was scheduled for May 4, 2017.
- The Court ordered the State to produce all discovery by March 1, 2017; the State provided no discovery by that date and instead produced materials by email on May 1, 2017 and an MVR copy on May 3, 2017.
- On May 4, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to exclude all evidence produced after the discovery deadline. The Court denied dismissal and declined to exclude all untimely evidence but excluded blood-draw and blood-chemical-analysis evidence. Trial was continued for other reasons.
- Defendant filed a motion for reargument arguing the denial to exclude all untimely evidence was manifestly unjust and would fail to deter repeated State discovery violations.
- The State acknowledged the late disclosure but characterized it as negligent (not willful) and argued exclusion of all evidence was unnecessary because the defense then had possession and time to prepare.
- The Court denied reargument: it applied Civil Rule 59(e) standards, held sanctions are case-specific, found the chosen sanction (excluding blood-related evidence) appropriate, and concluded Defendant failed to show newly discovered evidence, legal error, or manifest injustice.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court should exclude all evidence produced after the discovery deadline | Exclusion of all evidence is too severe; late disclosure was negligent and defense ultimately received materials before trial | All untimely evidence must be excluded to remedy prejudice and deter recurring discovery violations | Denied; exclusion of blood evidence only was an appropriate, case-specific sanction |
| Whether the Court should dismiss the case for discovery violation | Dismissal is unwarranted absent willful/egregious misconduct and substantial prejudice | Dismissal or full exclusion necessary to enforce scheduling orders and preserve case-review integrity | Denied; dismissal not warranted |
| Whether a motion for reargument under CCP rules is appropriate here | No new evidence, change in law, or misapprehension of facts; Civil Rule 59(e) governs reargument | Argues manifest injustice based on inconsistency with other cases and need for deterrence | Denied; movant did not meet Rule 59(e) standards (no manifest injustice, new law, or overlooked controlling precedent) |
| Whether broader deterrence of State misconduct justifies harsher sanction | Sanctions under Rule 16 are remedial for the particular defendant, not to punish hypotheticals | Court should impose stronger sanctions to deter future State violations | Rejected; sanctions are individualized and not designed primarily to deter future hypothetical misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Oliver v. State, 60 A.3d 1093 (Del. 2013) (discusses balance between public interest and defendant's fair-trial rights)
- Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2004) (principles on balancing societal needs and defendant rights in scheduling and trial management)
- Washington v. State, 844 A.2d 293 (Del. 2004) (trial court discretion to manage docket and scheduling orders)
- In re Hillis, 858 A.2d 325 (Del. 2004) (purpose and importance of case review process to conserve trial resources)
