459 P.3d 66
Ariz.2020Background
- In 2008 at ASPC-Lewis, Thomas Riley (an Aryan Brotherhood affiliate) and two accomplices entered Sean Kelly’s cell and stabbed him to death; Riley later wrote a detailed letter boasting of the murder. Evidence included blood on Riley and clothing bearing his inmate number and DNA matching Kelly.
- Riley was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and assisting a criminal street gang; the jury found five aggravators ((F)(2), (F)(6), (F)(7)(a), (F)(11), (F)(13)) and recommended death; trial court sentenced accordingly.
- Pretrial Riley sought new counsel (claimed breakdown in communication); motion denied after hearing; Riley later briefly self‑represented then returned to counsel and did not renew substitution request.
- Riley waived presentation of mitigating evidence after knowing colloquies and a competency check; the jury nonetheless was instructed that it could consider mitigating evidence from the record.
- Riley raised numerous challenges on appeal (counsel substitution, jury questionnaire language, juror voir dire, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on duress and aggravators, accomplice instruction during aggravation, prosecutorial remarks, Simmons parole instruction, and constitutionality of death‑penalty scheme); the Supreme Court affirmed convictions and death sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Riley's Argument | State's/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of motion to change counsel | Complete breakdown in communication with lead counsel warranted substitution | Court held hearing, found insufficient proof of irreconcilable conflict; counsel competent | Denial not an abuse of discretion; no Sixth Amendment violation |
| Jury questionnaire language describing aggravators as "very few" and "very specific" | Misstated law and created an illegitimate eligibility factor; fundamental error | Statement was at most ambiguous and was repeatedly corrected by later instructions; no prejudice | Not fundamental error; no relief |
| Failure to sua sponte question/strike jurors based on questionnaire answers (Jurors 1 & 16) | Jurors’ questionnaire answers showed bias; trial court should have probed further | Both jurors said they could follow law and be impartial; defense had opportunity to question and did not strike | No fundamental error; jurors were acceptable |
| Admission of victim’s prior protective custody and related testimony | Irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial; State failed to show Riley knew of it (motive proof) | Evidence showed motive (AB targeted inmates in PC); circumstantial evidence and Riley’s letter supported inferences | Relevant; admissible; no Rule 403 abuse |
| Victim-character testimony (Officer Vincent) | Improper evidence comparing victim’s character to Riley’s | Victim’s character not at issue; but admission was harmless given overwhelming guilt evidence | Erroneous admission of two sentences but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Admission of Officer Vincent’s observation ("atta-boy") | Lacked foundation and was improper opinion | Based on perception; helpful to distinguish Riley’s demeanor from panic | Proper under Rules 602 and 701; admissible |
| Duress instruction (duress not a defense to murder) | Instruction broadened issues and arguably commented on evidence | Neither party relied on duress; instruction prevented juror confusion about duress as a defense | No fundamental error; instruction permissible and not prejudicial |
| (F)(13) "cold, calculated" instruction omitted baseline statement that all murders have some reflection | Omission failed to narrow aggravator adequately | Instruction otherwise defined and required heightened premeditation beyond first-degree murder | Instruction adequate under precedent (Hausner); no reversible error |
| Constitutionality of (F)(6) "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" | Vagueness; jury cannot reliably apply descriptive guidance | Court’s longstanding constructions and jury instructions provide narrowing guidance | Aggravator constitutional as applied; jury instructions adequate |
| Use of accomplice liability instruction in aggravation phase | Lowered State’s burden to prove defendant’s own mens rea for aggravators | Prosecutor read instruction to rebut defense re‑litigation of guilt; aggravators supported by evidence | Not fundamental error; any error harmless given overwhelming evidence |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (various remarks) | Remarks misstated law, inflamed jury, or referenced unsupported facts | Many remarks were invited rebuttal, supported by evidence or harmless; jury repeatedly instructed | No fundamental error; cumulative‑misconduct claim fails |
| Simmons parole‑ineligibility instruction | Trial court repeatedly referenced parole eligibility; failure to give Simmons instruction was error | Defendant and counsel had multiple opportunities to request different instructions but did not; Bush controls | No Simmons error; defendant failed to request instruction and was not deprived of the right |
| Challenge to Arizona’s capital scheme and request for evidentiary hearing | Scheme fails to narrow eligibility; statistical record requires hearing | Hidalgo and related precedents uphold scheme; evidentiary hearing unnecessary | Denied; Hidalgo controls; no abuse of discretion to refuse hearing |
| Waiver of mitigation and constitutionality of A.R.S. §13-752(G) | Jury must be given means to consider mitigation even if defendant waives presentation | Eighth Amendment requires ability to consider mitigating evidence but not presentation over a defendant’s voluntary waiver; statutory scheme and precedent uphold waiver | Waiver was knowing and voluntary; §13-752(G) constitutional; no relief |
| Jury’s death sentence abuse of discretion | Death sentence excessive given mitigating evidence and defendant’s contested role | Aggravators and evidence (Riley’s letter, physical and forensic evidence) supported findings; jurors could rationally reject mitigation | No abuse of discretion; death sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421 (trial-counsel substitution standard; abuse-of-discretion review)
- State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181 (conflict with counsel must be more than strategic disagreement)
- State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60 (constitutionality and narrowing of (F)(13) instruction)
- Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (upholding narrowing constructions for (F)(6) aggravator)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (capital sentencer must be able to consider mitigation)
- State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 (when juror’s questionnaire disagreement is cured by follow-up and assurances)
- State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327 (fundamental-error review framework in capital cases)
- State v. Hidalgo, 241 Ariz. 543 (challenge to narrowing function of Arizona’s death-penalty scheme)
- State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233 (abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of jury’s death sentence)