State of Arizona v. Shawn Patrick Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84

Background

Victim James Panzarella was found bound with his throat slit after Lynch and co-defendant Sehwani used his credit/debit cards and stole property; Lynch’s shoes had the victim’s blood and Panzarella’s gun and keys were found with Lynch/at his motel.
Lynch was convicted of first‑degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary; initially sentenced to death, this Court remanded for a new penalty-phase (Lynch I) due to an erroneous instruction.
On resentencing a new penalty‑phase jury again returned a death sentence; Lynch appealed automatically under Arizona law.
On appeal Lynch raised many claims, principally: prosecutorial misconduct during the retrial, that the retrial was improperly limited to the penalty phase and the prior guilty‑verdict form was excluded, the court’s refusal to give a Simmons parole‑ineligibility instruction, Batson challenge to peremptory strikes, a juror challenge, Eighth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s death‑penalty procedures, and that mitigation was sufficient to require leniency.
The Court affirmed: it rejected reversal for prosecutorial misconduct (individual incidents cured or not prejudicial cumulatively), held the remand properly limited to the penalty phase, declined to require a Simmons instruction, rejected Batson and juror‑bias claims, found no constitutional bar to Arizona’s death penalty on this record, and performed independent review concluding aggravators outweighed mitigation.

Issues

Issue	Lynch’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Prosecutorial misconduct (multiple remarks/examining witnesses)	Misconduct individually and cumulatively deprived Lynch of a fair penalty retrial	Many remarks were objectionable but cured by rulings/instructions; not prejudicial	No reversible or fundamental error; most objections sustained and jury instructions cured prejudice
Scope of retrial; exclusion of prior guilty‑verdict form	Remand required full resentencing/aggravation retrial and admission of guilty‑verdict as evidence relevant to mitigation	Remand in Lynch I ordered a new penalty phase only; §13‑752 allows limiting retrial when aggravation phase was not flawed	Remand limited to penalty phase only; excluding the guilty‑verdict form was not an abuse — defendant could present aggravation evidence otherwise
Simmons instruction (parole ineligibility)	Requested instruction that jury be told Lynch would never be released if not sentenced to death	Parole eligibility was not legally impossible; Simmons applies only where parole is unavailable as a matter of law	Court properly refused Simmons instruction because parole/release possibility remained under governing law
Batson challenge to peremptory strikes of Hispanic jurors	Strikes were racially motivated; proffered reasons pretextual	Proffered race‑neutral reasons (death‑penalty views, hung jury history, tattoos/appearance, negative reaction to abuse)	Trial court’s acceptance of race‑neutral reasons not clearly erroneous; Batson denial affirmed
Juror challenge (Juror 5 knew State’s witness)	Juror’s acquaintance with prosecution witness required strike	Juror only recognized witness from hospital, had no direct dealings, affirmed impartiality	No abuse of discretion in denying strike; juror’s relationship and assurances did not mandate dismissal
Sufficiency of mitigation / independent review	Mitigation (health, childhood, drug abuse, low future dangerousness, sentencing disparity) substantial enough to call for leniency	Mitigation was weak or remote; aggravators (pecuniary gain and especially cruel/depraved) strongly established	Independent review affirmed death sentence: (F)(5) and (F)(6) proved; mitigation afforded minimal weight and did not outweigh aggravation

Key Cases Cited

State v. Lynch, 225 Ariz. 27 (2010) (remanding for new penalty-phase due to erroneous instruction)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory strikes impermissible if motivated by race)
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (due process requires parole‑ineligibility instruction when future dangerousness is at issue and parole is impossible as a matter of law)
State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 (2006) (prosecutorial misconduct standard; improper attacks on counsel; vouching)
State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516 (2011) (mitigation: difficult childhood may be mitigating but remoteness/connection to crime affects weight)
State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 (1993) (limits on opening statements; counsel may not argue facts not in evidence)
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (Supreme Court rejection of categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to lethal injection protocols)
State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560 (2010) (cumulative prosecutorial misconduct standard)