444 P.3d 250
Ariz.2019Background
- Hector Sebastian Nunez-Diaz, an undocumented immigrant, was charged with two class 4 felonies for possession of methamphetamine and cocaine; no prior criminal history is shown.
- Family retained a law firm with immigration experience; assigned criminal defense counsel advised accepting a plea to a single class 6 undesignated felony (possession of drug paraphernalia).
- Under the plea the court suspended sentencing and placed Nunez-Diaz on 18 months unsupervised probation; he was transferred to ICE custody and informed the plea would lead to deportation and an inability to bond out.
- Post-conviction, Nunez-Diaz petitioned under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) because counsel misadvised about immigration consequences; trial court granted relief and set aside the plea.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; State sought review arguing Nunez-Diaz was deportable regardless of the plea and thus suffered no Strickland prejudice.
- Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding counsel’s advice was deficient and that the plea caused severe, mandatory immigration consequences (including a permanent bar to reentry) amounting to Strickland prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s immigration advice during plea was constitutionally deficient | Counsel misrepresented/failed to advise clear, severe immigration consequences; thus performance was objectively unreasonable | Performance was adequate or any error harmless because deportability was independent of the plea | Counsel’s performance was deficient under Padilla; State conceded deficiency; first prong of Strickland satisfied |
| Whether prejudice under Strickland exists when a deportable noncitizen pleaded guilty based on deficient advice | But for the bad advice, Nunez-Diaz would have rejected the plea and proceeded to trial or continued negotiations; trial offered a rational (though slim) chance to avoid mandatory removal and permanent bar to reentry | No prejudice because Nunez-Diaz was already deportable and would have been removed regardless of the plea; any immigration relief was speculative | Prejudice established: permanent bar to reentry and automatic, irreversible removal resulting from the plea are material harms; Lee controls that pursuing a low-probability trial to avoid severe immigration consequences can be rational |
| Whether the State can show the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Nunez-Diaz lost unique, irreversible immigration consequences tied solely to the plea (permanent bar) — not harmless | State argued the error was harmless because removal would have occurred anyway under other statutes | State failed to prove harmlessness; relief not barred by harmless-error rule |
| Scope of Padilla/Lee to undocumented defendants already subject to removal | Nunez-Diaz argued Padilla/Lee protect aliens whose plea causes additional, certain immigration penalties (e.g., permanent bar), regardless of prior deportability | State argued Lee does not apply where defendant was already removable; courts pre-Lee held no prejudice if deportability preexisted | Court holds Padilla and Lee apply where plea causes distinct, automatic, non-speculative immigration consequences (here, permanent bar) even if some deportability existed before the plea |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (established two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must advise when immigration consequences of a plea are clear)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice standard for ineffective-assistance claims arising from guilty pleas)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (defendant may be prejudiced where inaccurate advice led to a plea that guaranteed deportation; pursuing a low-probability trial can be rational)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (prejudice assessed by denial of the entire judicial proceeding)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (ineffective assistance standards applied to plea-bargaining context)