State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson
237 Ariz. 381
| Ariz. | 2015Background
- Defendant Michael Jonathon Carlson lived on a Pima County property and, believing two residents (KR and Becky) had stolen from the owner, forced them into his car, shot them, and burned their remains; he later confessed to these murders and to other uncorroborated killings during a jailhouse television interview.
- Carlson was tried, convicted of two counts of kidnapping and two counts of first-degree (felony) murder, and the jury found three aggravators: prior serious offenses (A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(2)), committing the murders while on release from custody (F)(7), and multiple murders (F)(8). The jury sentenced him to death for each murder; kidnappings received consecutive 21-year terms.
- At trial the State introduced Carlson’s televised confession; defense argued the corpus delicti for the kidnappings was not independently established and thus the confession should be excluded.
- Defense sought to present expert Dr. Craig Haney to explain false-confession risk factors and to relay Carlson’s statements to Haney that Carlson had falsely confessed; the court limited Haney’s testimony.
- Defense sought a Willits instruction regarding the State’s failure to preserve/obtain a resident’s cell phone and records; the court denied it. Other contested issues included use of the predicate kidnappings as an (F)(2) aggravator, prosecutor argument and jury instructions in penalty phase, victim-impact testimony commenting on sentencing, and legality of consecutive sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of televised confession (corpus delicti for kidnappings) | State: confession admissible because independent circumstantial evidence (blood/DNA, purse, disposal of remains) corroborated kidnappings | Carlson: State failed to prove corpus delicti for kidnappings absent his statements; confession unreliable because he also admitted to many uncorroborated murders | Court: Affirmed admission—Arizona requires modest corroboration; evidence of Becky’s kidnapping and closely related facts corroborated KR’s kidnapping; jury decides truth of confession |
| Enmund/Tison instruction and accomplice liability | State: Enmund/Tison appropriate to assess death-eligibility | Carlson: Jury’s Enmund/Tison findings suggest accomplice theory was used without accomplice instructions; error | Court: No error—findings didn’t necessarily mean jurors thought someone else killed victims; no evidence of accomplice; accomplice instruction unnecessary |
| Exclusion of parts of Dr. Haney’s testimony (false-confession claim and risk-factor opinions) | Carlson: exclusion violated right to present a defense/Compulsory Process/Confrontation | State: excluded as inadmissible hearsay and improper expert vouching; Dr. Haney lacked basis to opine on voluntary media confessions or diagnose propensity to lie | Court: No abuse of discretion—prevented hearsay/parroting (Rule 702/703) and expert from usurping jury (no diagnosis or reliable basis for propensity testimony); exclusion did not violate constitutional rights |
| Willits instruction for missing cell phone/records | Carlson: State failed to preserve material, exculpatory evidence; jurors should be allowed adverse inference | State: phone/records speculative and not shown likely exculpatory or lost in bad faith | Court: Denial proper—defendant only speculated about usefulness and offered no evidence of State bad faith; no due process violation |
| Use of predicate kidnappings as (F)(2) prior serious offense aggravator | Carlson: Using contemporaneous predicate felonies as (F)(2) fails to narrow death-eligible class; Eighth Amendment problem | State: 2003 amendment to §13–751(F)(2) expressly allows contemporaneous serious offenses; statute narrows sentencing via §13–751(J) | Court: Follows State v. Forde—(F)(2) as amended constitutional; contemporaneous kidnappings may be considered |
| Prosecutor argument and penalty-phase jury instruction referencing "facts and circumstances of the case" | Carlson: Instruction and prosecutorial argument improperly allowed jurors to consider circumstances as non-statutory aggravators and to weigh them improperly against mitigation | State: Statute and precedent permit consideration of circumstances to rebut mitigation and for jurors to evaluate all relevant evidence | Court: No fundamental error—instruction acceptable; prosecutor did not argue a non-alleged aggravator but rebutted mitigation; caution advised on wording but harmless here |
| Victim-impact statement referencing punishment recommendation | Carlson: Victim statements improperly urged death and violated rules prohibiting sentencing recommendations | State: Court instructed jurors sentencing recommendation is not to be considered; victim may describe impact | Court: Allowing the sentencing-question comment was error but brief and cured by limiting instruction; harmless here; prosecutors/judges must vet victim statements carefully |
| Consecutive sentences for kidnapping and felony murder; double jeopardy and §13–116 | Carlson: Kidnapping was predicate to felony murder so consecutive sentences violate §13–116 and Double Jeopardy | State: Murder (ultimate offense) is distinct from predicate offense; Gordon test supports consecutive sentences where facts remaining after subtracting murder still satisfy kidnapping elements and risk of additional harm exists | Court: No error—applies Gordon; kidnapping and murder are distinct offenses; consecutive sentences and no double jeopardy violation |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324 (discussing standard of review for corpus delicti corroboration)
- State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442 (corroboration standard for confession admissibility)
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (defining death-eligibility when defendant did not personally kill)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (major participant/reckless indifference standard for death-eligibility)
- Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (trustworthiness corroboration doctrine for confessions)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (expert-admissibility gatekeeping principles)
- Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (requirement of meaningful appellate review in capital cases)