State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercado
234 Ariz. 590
| Ariz. | 2014Background
- Martin Salazar-Mercado was tried for multiple counts of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor; the State proposed expert testimony from Dr. Wendy Dutton about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS).
- Salazar-Mercado moved to exclude Dutton’s testimony as a “cold” (general/educative) and “blind” (not tied to these victims) expert under amended Ariz. R. Evid. 702(d).
- The trial court admitted Dutton’s testimony (general descriptions of child abuse disclosure patterns and factors affecting disclosure); the jury convicted and imposed lengthy sentences.
- The court of appeals affirmed; the Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether Rule 702 and Daubert bar “cold” expert testimony.
- The Supreme Court examined Rule 702’s language and history (conforming Arizona Rule 702 to Federal Rule 702 and Daubert/Kumho), the federal advisory notes, and prior Arizona precedent on CSAAS.
- The Court concluded the record lacked evidence challenging CSAAS’s reliability and that Dutton stayed within limits (did not opine on victims’ veracity), so admitting her general testimony was within the trial court’s discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ariz. R. Evid. 702(d) requires experts to apply methods to the case facts before testifying | Rule 702(d) requires experts to apply principles to the particular facts (thus barring "cold" experts) | Rule 702(d) applies only where the expert purports to apply methods to case facts; it does not bar general educative testimony | 702(d) does not bar "cold" expert testimony; such testimony admissible if it satisfies 702(a)–(c) and Rule 403 |
| Whether Dutton’s CSAAS testimony satisfied Rule 702(a)–(c) | Dutton’s testimony was unhelpful and unreliable because she was not aware of case facts and could not opine on veracity | Dutton was qualified; CSAAS testimony can help jurors understand delayed/inconsistent disclosures and she would not testify about veracity | Dutton’s general testimony could help the jury and satisfied Rule 702(a); trial court did not abuse discretion admitting it |
| Whether CSAAS should be re-evaluated under Daubert-style reliability scrutiny | Salazar-Mercado urged fresh scrutiny, claiming flaws in CSAAS literature and reliability | State relied on Arizona precedent approving CSAAS and noted no evidentiary challenge was presented at trial | Court declined to reassess CSAAS absent a developed record challenging it; trial judge acted properly given the record |
| Whether expert may opine on credibility of particular witnesses | Salazar-Mercado argued risk of expert invading jury’s role by addressing credibility | State and trial court relied on Lindsey/Moran limits preventing expert credibility opinions | Experts may not opine on the credibility or accuracy of specific witnesses; Dutton complied with those limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishes reliability gatekeeping for expert testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extends Daubert gatekeeping to non-scientific expert testimony)
- State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472 (1986) (limits experts from testifying on veracity of particular witnesses)
- State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378 (1986) (reinforces that experts cannot opine on specific witness credibility)
- State v. Lujan, 192 Ariz. 448 (1998) (approves use of CSAAS-style evidence to explain victim behavior)
- United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholds admission of generalized CSAAS testimony in child abuse case)