State of Arizona v. Keyaira Porter
491 P.3d 1100
Ariz.2021Background
- Keyaira Porter, an African American defendant, was charged with aggravated assault on a police officer and resisting arrest; the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the only two Black venire members (Prospective Jurors 2 and 20).
- Prosecutor’s stated reasons: Juror 2 — brother convicted of aggravated assault and appeared uncertain about impartiality (demeanor-based); Juror 20 — had been foreperson on a prior criminal jury that acquitted the defendant (non-demeanor-based).
- Porter raised a Batson challenge; the trial court denied it, finding the prosecutor’s explanations "reasonable."
- The court of appeals remanded, directing the trial court to make explicit findings on the demeanor-based justification under Snyder v. Louisiana or vacate; a divided panel reasoned Snyder required express credibility findings for demeanor explanations.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide whether federal or state Batson precedent requires express findings on demeanor-based justifications when a non-demeanor reason is also offered and neither reason is shown to be pretextual.
- The Court vacated the court of appeals, affirmed the trial court’s denial of Batson, and held that no express-finding requirement exists in those circumstances; it also held Porter waived any complaint about comparative juror analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Snyder requires trial courts to make express findings on demeanor-based reasons when a non-demeanor reason is also offered and neither is shown pretextual | Porter: trial court failed to expressly address demeanor-based reason; Snyder requires explicit credibility findings for demeanor explanations | State: Snyder only requires express findings when the other (non-demeanor) reason is clearly pretextual; otherwise implicit findings suffice | Court: No automatic express-finding requirement; Snyder applies only where the non-demeanor reason is clearly pretextual and court did not clarify which reason it credited |
| Whether Arizona law requires explicit step-three Batson findings in all cases (including under Lucas/Williams) | Porter: Arizona precedent and some state decisions support requiring explicit findings to guard against discrimination | State: Arizona precedent permits implicit credibility findings; explicit findings not always required | Court: Arizona law does not mandate explicit findings in every Batson step; implicit findings are acceptable where record does not show pretext |
| Whether a comparative juror analysis is required and whether failure to compare here warrants reversal | Porter: trial court failed to compare struck Black jurors to non-struck jurors, showing pretext | State: Comparative analysis is not constitutionally required and Porter waived the argument by not raising it at trial | Court: Comparative analysis not required; Porter waived the claim by failing to timely object; no clear error in denying Batson |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory strikes may not be used to exclude jurors on account of race)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (demeanor-based justifications scrutinized; if a non-demeanor reason is clearly pretextual, an express credibility finding on demeanor is required)
- Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (Batson three-step framework and burden-shifting for race-neutral explanations)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (appellate courts should give deference to trial judge credibility determinations in Batson contexts)
- Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (comparative juror questioning and patterns of strikes are relevant to Batson analysis)
- State v. Porter, 248 Ariz. 392 (App. 2020) (court of appeals decision remanding for express findings; vacated by Arizona Supreme Court)
- State v. Smith, 250 Ariz. 69 (2020) (Arizona precedent permitting appellate deference to implicit Batson step-three findings)
- State v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366 (App. 2001) (one impermissible discriminatory reason can taint other race-neutral reasons; distinguished here)