State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Holle
240 Ariz. 300
| Ariz. | 2016Background
- Jerry Charles Hollé was prosecuted for sexual abuse and child molestation based on allegations by his eleven-year-old step-granddaughter that he touched and kissed her.
- Hollé requested a jury instruction requiring the State to prove sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt; the trial court instead instructed that lack of sexual motivation is an affirmative defense Hollé must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury convicted Hollé of child molestation and sexual abuse; one charge (sexual conduct with a minor) was later dismissed with prejudice.
- The court of appeals held § 13-1407(E) was not an affirmative defense and that, once the defendant produced evidence, the State must prove sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt, but found the trial instruction harmless and affirmed convictions.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split with State v. Simpson and addressed whether § 13-1407(E) places the burden on defendants to prove lack of sexual motivation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether lack of sexual motivation under A.R.S. § 13-1407(E) is an element of sexual-abuse/child-molestation offenses | State: § 13-1404 and § 13-1410 define elements (intent/knowledge and sexual contact); sexual motivation is not an element | Hollé: sexual motivation is what makes the conduct criminal and thus must be an element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt | Held: Not an element; statutes’ plain text defines elements without motive; § 13-1407(E) is separate and identifies a defense |
| Whether § 13-1407(E) is an affirmative defense or a justification/element-negating defense | State: Legislature designated § 13-1407 as defenses; lack of sexual motivation is an affirmative defense that defendant may be required to prove | Hollé: treats defense as negating an element or otherwise impermissibly shifting burden, violating due process | Held: § 13-1407(E) is an affirmative defense; defendant must prove lack of sexual motivation by preponderance |
| Whether placing burden on defendant to prove lack of sexual motivation violates due process | Hollé: shifting burden on to defendant for proof of absence of motive infringes due process and Winship principles | State: Supreme Court precedent allows states to require defendants to prove affirmative defenses by preponderance; constitutional limits not breached here | Held: Constitutional—permitted; Martin and Patterson allow the allocation for affirmative defenses; no due process violation |
| Whether the trial court’s instruction (requiring Hollé to prove lack of sexual motivation) was erroneous and/or harmless | Court of appeals: instruction was erroneous but harmless because evidence showed sexual motivation | Hollé: instruction violated due process and was erroneous | Held: Trial court correctly instructed under statutes; convictions and sentences affirmed; court of appeals opinion vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Simpson, 217 Ariz. 326 (App. 2007) (held § 13-1407(E) assigns burden to defendant for lack of sexual motivation)
- State v. Getz, 189 Ariz. 561 (1997) (refused to superimpose § 13-1407 defenses into elements of sexual-abuse statute)
- State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310 (1966) (interpreted older molestation statute to require sexual motivation as an implied element)
- Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (states may require defendant to prove affirmative defenses by preponderance)
- Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (state may assign burden to defendant for certain defenses within limits)
- In re Pima County Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2, 164 Ariz. 25 (1990) (noted sexual abuse statute did not require sexual motivation)
- State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67 (2001) (courts may not add elements to statutorily defined crimes)