State of Arizona v. Jasper Phillip Rushing
CR-15-0268-AP
| Ariz. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- In September 2010, Jasper Phillip Rushing, housed in a one-person isolation cell with Shannon P., fatally attacked Shannon; Rushing later admitted using a rolled-up magazine and a razor and a bloody razor and a bludgeoning device were recovered.
- Rushing was indicted for premeditated first-degree murder; guilt was not contested, but premeditation was the jury’s disputed issue.
- During postarrest processing, an un-Mirandized corrections officer (Trujillo) elicited Rushing’s admission describing the order/manner of the wounds; the jury nonetheless heard that statement after a juror question elicited it at trial.
- The trial court admitted several gruesome cell and autopsy photographs; the jury found three aggravators including especially heinous/depraved conduct (A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6)) and that Rushing committed the offense while in DOC custody, then returned a death sentence.
- On appeal the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but—relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Lynch v. Arizona decision—vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase because the jury was not informed that Rushing was parole ineligible when future dangerousness was at issue.
Issues
| Issue | Rushing's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of the Trujillo (un‑Mirandized) statement introduced via juror question | Statement was obtained in violation of Miranda and was highly prejudicial; admission was fundamental error | Prosecutor disclaimed using it pretrial and Rushing waived by failing to object to juror question; any error harmless | Court: Waiver (failure to object) not invited error; admission was error but not fundamental or prejudicial—premeditation proven by other circumstantial evidence; no reversal of conviction |
| Admission of gruesome cell and autopsy photographs | Photos were irrelevant to premeditation and unfairly prejudicial | Photos were relevant to cause of death, corroboration, and showing time/force permitting reflection | Court: No abuse of discretion—photos relevant and probative value outweighed prejudicial effect |
| Sufficiency of the (F)(6) heinous/depraved aggravator | Insufficient evidence that Rushing knew or should have known he had inflicted a fatal injury before inflicting additional gratuitous violence | Evidence (order of wounds, multiple blows, severing of penis, blood pattern) supported gratuitous violence after fatal injury | Court: Substantial evidence supports (F)(6); aggravator proven |
| Failure to instruct jury that defendant is parole ineligible (Simmons / Lynch II) | Court should have instructed jury (or allowed evidence) that Rushing is parole ineligible when future dangerousness was at issue | State argued only applies when prosecution puts future dangerousness at issue or error was harmless | Court: Prosecutor put future dangerousness at issue; under Lynch II the jury must be informed of parole ineligibility; error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—vacated death sentence and remanded for new penalty phase |
| Scope of State’s mental‑health exam and compelled questioning | Trial court violated Fifth Amendment by allowing State’s expert to ask about the offense and requiring cooperation as condition to present mitigation evidence | Once defendant places mental health at issue, State may examine to rebut and trial court can condition admission on cooperation (Phillips framework) | Court: No abuse of discretion in allowing examination; defendant waives privilege by placing mental condition at issue; but some evidentiary issues (e.g., certain audiotapes, white‑supremacist rebuttal) left for resolution on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Sup. Ct.) (established Miranda warnings requirement for custodial interrogation)
- Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (U.S. 2016) (Lynch II) (a capital defendant is entitled to jury instruction that he is parole ineligible when future dangerousness is at issue)
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (Sup. Ct.) (due process requires parole‑ineligibility instruction where future dangerousness is at issue and parole is unavailable)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (Sup. Ct.) (standards for invoking Miranda rights; ambiguous remarks do not necessarily invoke right to silence)
- Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (Sup. Ct.) (Fifth Amendment limits on compelled psychiatric examination and use of statements at sentencing)
- Phillips v. Araneta, 208 Ariz. 280 (Ariz. 2004) (trial court may order state‑chosen mental exam when defendant places mental condition at issue and set conditions for use of statements)