State of Arizona v. Jasper Phillip Rushing, 573 P.3d 72

Background

In 2010, while incarcerated, Jasper Phillip Rushing killed another inmate, Shannon P., in a particularly gruesome manner, resulting in a first-degree murder conviction.
The jury found three aggravating factors: prior conviction carrying a possible life/death sentence, especially heinous conduct, and commission of the offense while in state custody.
Rushing was initially sentenced to death, but the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the sentence in 2017 for a new penalty phase to comply with U.S. Supreme Court directives (Simmons v. South Carolina; Lynch v. Arizona).
On remand, Rushing waived his right to counsel and presentation of mitigating evidence, choosing to represent himself with advisory counsel and declining to provide any mitigation.
The trial court allowed Rushing to be visibly restrained before the jury. He did not object to this at trial. The jury again sentenced him to death.
On automatic appeal, Rushing challenged his death sentence on several due process and procedural grounds related to the penalty phase.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Visible Restraints Before Jury	Shackling was inherently prejudicial and improper without individualized findings, violating due process.	No objection made; security concerns and past convictions warranted restraints.	Error to allow restraints w/o case-specific findings, but not fundamental error; no new trial.
Waiver of Mitigation	Trial court should have ensured all mitigating evidence was presented or appointed third party; due process and sentencing fairness violated.	Rushing knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived mitigation presentation.	No relief; error was invited and courts not required to override informed waiver of mitigation.
Refusal to Give Proposed Jury Instructions	Court erred by rejecting non-standard or expanded instructions, particularly on juror autonomy, mitigation, and moral judgment.	Instructions given already covered necessary law; additional language was either incorrect or redundant.	No abuse of discretion; instructions were legally adequate and did not mislead the jury.
Failure to Define "Moral Culpability"	Not defining the term led to jury confusion and improper limiting of mitigators, violating due process and Eighth Amendment.	"Moral culpability" is commonly understood; referring jury to instructions was sufficient.	Even if error, not fundamental; instructions, viewed as a whole, were adequate.
Cumulative Prosecutorial Error	Prosecutor withheld mitigation and misstated mitigation law, collectively denying a fair penalty phase.	Prosecutor not obligated to introduce mitigation; law was stated correctly; no misconduct.	No prosecutorial error found; cumulative error doctrine not implicated.

Key Cases Cited

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (prohibiting routine visible shackling of defendants without case-specific findings in penalty phase)
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (requiring juries be informed of parole ineligibility as mitigation)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (holding jail garb may prejudice a jury)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (Eighth Amendment requires sentencer consider all defendant’s proffered mitigation)
Brown v. California, 479 U.S. 538 (mitigation must be rationally related to defendant's character or offense, not mere sentiment)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (sentencers cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence under Eighth Amendment)