505 P.3d 657
Ariz.2022Background
- In April 2018 Max Fontes allegedly drove 70–95 mph in a 45 mph zone and collided with Angel Shelby’s vehicle as Shelby attempted a left turn.
- Shelby and his seven‑month‑old son G.T. were unrestrained, both were ejected; G.T. died and Shelby was seriously injured; Shelby’s blood tested positive for THC and he later pled guilty to DUI and endangerment.
- Fontes was charged with manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and criminal damage; he conceded contributing to the collision but argued his legal responsibility ended at the moment of impact.
- Fontes sought a superseding‑cause jury instruction based on Shelby’s alleged failures (no seatbelts, DUI, failure to yield); the trial court allowed him to present that defense.
- The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s order, reasoning Fontes’s speeding created the foreseeable risk and thus precluding a superseding‑cause instruction; the Arizona Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held Shelby’s alleged acts occurred simultaneously with Fontes’s alleged speeding and therefore were concurrent (not intervening) causes as a matter of law, so a superseding‑cause instruction is inappropriate; it vacated the court of appeals’ opinion for failing to address the intervening‑event threshold. The Court left admissibility of seatbelt evidence for other purposes to the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Fontes) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fontes was entitled to a superseding‑cause jury instruction | Superseding cause instruction inappropriate because Fontes’s speeding foreseeably created the fatal risk | Shelby’s failures (no seatbelts, DUI, failure to yield) were intervening, unforeseeable, and extraordinary, breaking causation | Held: No superseding‑cause instruction; Shelby’s acts were concurrent, not intervening, so superseding cause inapplicable |
| Whether Shelby’s conduct was an intervening event | Shelby’s conduct increased a foreseeable risk but does not become a superseding cause | Shelby’s conduct occurred after impact and caused the fatalities/injuries, so it was intervening | Held: Not intervening — occurred simultaneously with Fontes’s continuing conduct; therefore not a superseding event |
| Admissibility of evidence that Shelby and G.T. were unrestrained | Evidence inadmissible solely to support a superseding‑cause instruction | Fontes sought to admit it to support superseding‑cause defense | Held: Because superseding‑cause instruction inappropriate, that basis for admission fails; trial court may still admit the evidence for other purposes under Arizona Rules of Evidence |
| Appropriateness of special‑action review by court of appeals | State challenged trial court order via special action | Fontes did not contest special action jurisdiction | Held: Court did not decide whether special action was appropriate; cautioned appellate courts to consider whether trial rulings are preliminary before accepting special action review |
Key Cases Cited
- Torres v. JAI Dining Servs. (Phx.) Inc., 252 Ariz. 28 (clarifies actual and proximate cause and explains superseding‑cause standard)
- Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 147 Ariz. 160 (explains intervening vs. superseding cause and effect on liability)
- Zelman v. Stauder, 11 Ariz. App. 547 (discusses concurrent conduct and when outside force is not intervening)
- Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124 (holds concurrent negligence that continues up to injury does not allow escape from liability for intervening criminal act)
- Herzberg v. White, 49 Ariz. 313 (defines intervening force as operating after original actor’s act or omission)
- State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239 (discusses foreseeability in context of intervening acts)
- State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571 (adopts tort standard for superseding cause in criminal cases)