417 P.3d 787
Ariz.2018Background
- Arizona voters adopted Proposition 103 (2002), amending Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 13-3961 to categorically prohibit bail for certain sex offenses (including sexual assault) when "the proof is evident or the presumption great."
- Prior to this decision, Simpson II (241 Ariz. 341) held the categorical prohibition unconstitutional as applied to sexual conduct with a minor under 15, prompting courts to hold individualized § 13-3961(D) hearings for Proposition 103 offenses.
- Guy Goodman was charged with sexual assault (alleged nonconsensual digital penetration supported by DNA and an admission); the superior court held a § 13-3961(D) hearing and ordered bail and conditions after finding the state did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Goodman posed a substantial danger.
- The court of appeals vacated the bail order, holding sexual assault remained non-bailable post-Simpson II; the Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether the categorical ban violates due process.
- The Supreme Court considered Salerno’s two-step/regulatory-punitive and heightened scrutiny framework and evaluated whether the categorical ban (for sexual assault) served a legitimate, narrowly focused purpose or violated substantive due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Goodman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Proposition 103’s categorical bail ban for sexual assault is punishment or regulation | Goodman: It is regulatory but fails due-process limits | State: It is a permissible regulatory measure to protect public safety and ensure appearance | Regulatory, not punitive |
| Whether the ban serves a legitimate and compelling purpose under Salerno | Goodman: The purpose (public safety/appearance) asserted by State is insufficient without individualized risk assessment | State: Preventing dangerous sexual predators from reoffending and fleeing is a compelling interest | Serves a legitimate and compelling purpose |
| Whether the ban is narrowly focused (i.e., a convincing proxy for flight risk or future dangerousness) | Goodman: A sexual-assault charge alone does not inherently predict flight or future dangerousness; categorical denial is overbroad and lacks individualized findings | State: Sexual assault by definition is nonconsensual and inherently dangerous; proof evident/presumption great is a sufficient proxy for future dangerousness | Not narrowly focused; charge alone is not a valid proxy for future dangerousness |
| Whether the statute is facially unconstitutional | Goodman: The ban is facially invalid because it never requires individualized dangerousness determinations or a valid proxy | State / dissenters: Salerno facial challenge standard is not met because some applications are valid; statute is constitutional | Facial unconstitutionality affirmed — provision invalid on its face; courts must hold individualized § 13-3961(D) hearings before denying bail for sexual assault (except where defendant committed a new felony while on bail for another felony) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1979) (two-step test for punitive vs. regulatory pretrial detention and heightened scrutiny: legitimate compelling purpose and narrow focus)
- Simpson v. Miller (Simpson II), 241 Ariz. 341 (2017) (Arizona Supreme Court invalidated categorical bail ban for sexual conduct with a minor under 15 and required individualized assessments)
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (predicting future dangerousness involves complex, experience-based judgments)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upheld civil commitment tied to individualized finding of mental abnormality and dangerousness)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (sex-offender registration treated as regulatory; state may legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class)
- McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (characterizing sex offenders as a serious threat; recidivism considerations in regulatory context)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (invalidating detention without individualized adversarial procedures)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause requirement for post-arrest detention)
- State v. Wein, 242 Ariz. 352 (App. 2017) (court of appeals decision vacating the superior court’s bail order; later vacated by Arizona Supreme Court)