384 P.3d 1253
Ariz. Ct. App.2016Background
- Victim (J.D.) drank several whiskey shots and a mixed drink at a party, became "tipsy," vomited, fell asleep on a couch, and was later found with her pants and underwear pulled down and a man (Causbie) performing digital penetration. A witness (A.G.) observed the act and intervened. J.D. later experienced bleeding, bruising, and pelvic pain and reported the incident.
- Causbie was charged with sexual assault under A.R.S. § 13-1406; the statutory definition of "without consent" includes incapacity due to alcohol when the condition is known or reasonably should be known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)).
- Defense proposed jury instructions: (1) a narrowed definition requiring proof the victim was unable to comprehend the sexual nature of the act or unable to exercise the right to refuse because of alcohol; and (2) a supplemental instruction stating mere alcohol consumption does not preclude consent. The trial court refused both and gave the statutory-form instruction.
- The jury convicted on a general verdict; defendant appealed, arguing the statutory phrase "incapable of consent by reason of . . . alcohol" is unconstitutionally vague and that the court erred by refusing his proposed instructions.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed constitutional vagueness de novo and instruction refusal for abuse of discretion, and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statutory phrase "incapable of consent by reason of . . . alcohol" is unconstitutionally vague | Statute is sufficiently clear; "without consent" and statutory examples give fair notice and limit enforcement | Phrase is vague on its face and requires narrowing instructions to tell juries what degree of alcohol impairment precludes consent | Not vague; phrase gives fair notice and focuses on victim's capacity to consent, not a numeric intoxication threshold |
| Whether the trial court erred by refusing defendant's narrowed instruction requiring inability to comprehend sexual nature or inability to exercise refusal due to alcohol | N/A (state) | Defendant: Johnson requires specific guidance on degree of impairment; instruction necessary to avoid jury confusion | No error; Johnson distinguishes mental-disorder cases from temporary alcohol impairment; jurors can assess alcohol effects via common knowledge |
| Whether the court erred by refusing defendant's supplemental instruction that mere alcohol consumption does not negate consent | N/A (state) | Defendant: needed to prevent jury from equating any drinking with incapacity | No abuse of discretion; statutory instruction already focused on incapacity (not mere drinking) and covered that point |
| Whether prosecution's closing invited improper standards (e.g., DUI "slightest impairment") | N/A (state) | Defendant: prosecutor's comment that inability to drive showed lack of consent suggested improper standard | No prejudicial error; comment was one of many facts argued and did not import DUI standard |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Johnson, 155 Ariz. 23 (holding mental-disorder incapacity instruction must require proof the disorder precluded understanding intercourse and consequences)
- United States v. Solis, 75 M.J. 759 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App.) (upholding similar military statute; focus on incapacity to consent rather than a bright-line impairment threshold)
- State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305 (statutory definition "includes" is illustrative; "without consent" understandable in ordinary usage)
- State v. Inzunza, 234 Ariz. 78 (discussing evidentiary standard and viewing evidence in light favorable to verdict)