State of Arizona v. Debbie Lynn Copeland, 310 P.3d 46

Debbie Copeland pleaded guilty (March 28, 2011) to attempted aggravated assault (knife) as a Class 4 felony pursuant to a plea agreement; other charges/allegations (including a dangerous-offense enhancement) were dismissed.
The judgment of conviction expressly designated the offense as "nondangerous, nonrepetitive."
Copeland received probation (three years) and later successfully completed specialty-court requirements and had probation terminated.
Copeland applied to set aside her conviction and restore civil rights under A.R.S. §§ 13-907 and 13-908; the State argued § 13-907(D)(1) barred relief because the plea alleged a dangerous instrument/knife.
The trial judge granted the motion to set aside the conviction; the State sought special-action review, arguing the conviction was nonetheless "for a dangerous offense." The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and denied relief.

Issue	State's Argument	Copeland's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction designated as "non-dangerous" in the judgment can nevertheless be treated as a "conviction involving a dangerous offense" for purposes of § 13-907(D)(1), thus precluding an application to set aside the conviction	The plea and charging language (attempt with a knife) show the offense was "dangerous," so § 13-907(D)(1) bars setting aside even if the judgment labels it nondangerous; designation should not be conclusive	The judgment’s express nondangerous designation controls eligibility under § 13-907(D)(1); designation permits the application and precludes relitigation of that issue	The court held a trial court may rely on a conviction’s designation as nondangerous to find the defendant eligible to apply under § 13-907; the respondent did not abuse discretion in permitting Copeland to apply. The merits of setting aside remain discretionary under § 13-908.

State v. Leon, 197 Ariz. 48, 3 P.3d 968 (App. 1999) (distinguished: prior decision held a nondangerous designation for one statutory scheme did not preclude enhancement under a differently worded provision)
Montero v. Foreman, 204 Ariz. 378, 64 P.3d 206 (App. 2003) (explained that similar statutory terms—"dangerous" vs. "violent"—can have different legal effects)
State v. Key, 128 Ariz. 419, 626 P.2d 149 (App. 1981) (granting or denying set-aside relief under § 13-907 is within trial court’s discretion)
State v. Williams, 131 Ariz. 211, 639 P.2d 1036 (App. 1982) (principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to criminal judgments)