312 P.3d 1135
Ariz. Ct. App.2013Background
- In March 2010, C., then 15, told her mother Kelly (defendant’s wife) that defendant David Yonkman had touched her inappropriately; Kelly reported it and C. gave a forensic interview.
- Kelly later contacted police to say C. had recanted; Yonkman initially invoked Miranda rights when detained, then spoke with Kelly and later voluntarily called a detective to arrange a police-station interview, where he admitted touching C.’s breasts and vagina.
- At trial C. described two incidents; the state also presented testimony from two girls who reported prior sleepover molestations by Yonkman (charges for those acts had resulted in acquittal previously).
- The trial court admitted the other-act evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)/(c) but prohibited mention of the earlier trial verdicts; it admitted certain prior consistent statements by witnesses.
- Yonkman was convicted of sexual conduct with a minor and sexual abuse; he appealed on suppression (Miranda/agent/voluntariness), admission of other-act evidence (including acquitted conduct and preclusion of acquittal fact), and admission of prior consistent statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Yonkman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Miranda/Edwards waiver and whether wife acted as state agent | Waiver valid because Yonkman reinitiated contact; detective gave new Miranda warnings and questioning was lawful | Waiver involuntary due to prior invocation; detective induced wife to act as state agent to circumvent Edwards protection | Waiver valid: reinitiation by Yonkman and new warnings; trial court did not err in finding Kelly was not a state agent |
| Admission of other-act evidence where defendant was previously acquitted | Other-act evidence admissible under Rules 404(b)/(c) to show motive/plan/propensity; acquittal does not categorically bar admissibility | Admission improper because prior acquittal should preclude use of same allegations under Little | Admissible: acquittal does not automatically bar other-act evidence; Rule 404 analysis (clear & convincing, 403 balancing) governs |
| Preclusion of evidence that prior allegations resulted in acquittal (fact of acquittal) | Preclusion appropriate because prior acquittal is irrelevant and may confuse jurors | Jury should be informed of prior acquittal where presentation makes prior trial likely to be inferred; preclusion impaired cross-examination and defense | Excluding fact of acquittal was abuse of discretion here, but error was harmless given Yonkman’s confession to touching C. |
| Admission of prior consistent statements of victims | Statements were admissible or, if erroneous, harmless because witnesses later testified and statements were subject to cross-examination | Admission improper because no charge of recent fabrication or improper influence arose; statements thus failed Rule 801(d)(1)(B) test | Error (if any) was harmless; victim testimony and defendant’s confession made no effect on verdicts |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Yonkman, 231 Ariz. 496 (Ariz. 2013) (state supreme court decision addressing reinitiation and issues remanded)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warning and waiver principles)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (restriction on police-initiated interrogation after request for counsel)
- Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (U.S. 2010) (limited effect of earlier invocation after break in custody and reinitiation analysis)
- State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 (Ariz. 1960) (historic rule excluding evidence of acquitted conduct)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1990) (acquittal does not categorically bar admission of related evidence under lesser standards)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (U.S. 1997) (general acquittal carries no collateral estoppel effect)
- Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008) (framework for when an acquittal instruction or disclosure of acquittal is appropriate)