State of Arizona v. Darren Irving Goldin, 365 P.3d 364

Goldin pled guilty to second-degree murder under a plea that imposed an 11-year sentence to run consecutively to a Maricopa County term; defense counsel orally suggested the sentence would effectively commence from his 2010 arraignment because of presentence credit.
The written sentencing addendum and the court’s sentence granted 988 days’ presentence credit and confirmed the sentence was consecutive; DOC’s time computations showed the consecutive term would begin in 2016.
Goldin filed a delayed pro se Rule 32 notice more than a year after sentencing, was dismissed for untimeliness, then filed subsequent notices and a counseled petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on defense attorneys’ incorrect advice about when the sentence would run.
An evidentiary hearing revealed both trial attorneys and the prosecutor contributed to confusion and that counsel had told Goldin his sentence would “start” in 2010; Goldin said he would not have accepted the plea had he known the true effective start date.
The trial court found Goldin’s IAC claim precluded as untimely/successive under Rule 32, but the Court of Appeals (citing State v. Diaz) concluded the unusual facts warranted further consideration and remanded to allow the trial court to consider Rule 32.1(f) (failure to file without defendant’s fault).

Issue	Goldin's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Goldin’s IAC claim is precluded as untimely/successive	Counsel’s misadvice prevented timely filing; claim should be considered	IAC must be raised in the initial timely Rule 32 notice; successive or untimely IAC is precluded	Remanded: trial court must consider Rule 32.1(f) to decide if failure to file was without Goldin’s fault; if so, permit IAC claim to proceed
Whether Diaz v. State controls (allowing belated IAC where counsel’s failures caused default)	Diaz’s reasoning applies because Goldin was similarly blameless due to counsel’s misinformation	Diaz should be confined to very unusual facts and not extend broadly	Court found Goldin sufficiently similar to Diaz on these facts to require Rule 32.1(f) analysis and possible relief
Whether DOC miscalculation justified initial Rule 32 filing/relief	Counsel told Goldin DOC had miscalculated, prompting Rule 32 filings	DOC’s computations were correct; a plain DOC miscalculation alone is not cognizable	Court noted DOC error alone would not justify relief; focus is on counsel’s ineffective advice and timeliness under Rule 32.1(f)
Whether the record permits disposition on prejudice (Strickland) without further proceedings	Goldin argued prejudice (would not have pled)	State disputed preclusion and timeliness; merits contested	Court left Strickland prejudice determination to the trial court on remand (may decide on existing record or hold further proceedings)

State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361 (Ariz. 2014) (allowed first review of IAC where counsel’s failures, through no fault of defendant, caused prior procedural defaults)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390 (App. 2007) (successive IAC claims are generally precluded)
State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369 (App. 2010) (IAC claims fall under Rule 32.1(a); require timely notice)
Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446 (Ariz. 2002) (purpose of preclusion is to prevent repetitive post-conviction review)
State v. Cordova, 105 Ariz. 597 (Ariz. 1970) (guilty plea must be voluntary and with understanding)
State v. Lamas, 143 Ariz. 564 (Ariz. 1985) (plea involuntariness where court failed to inform defendant of sentencing conditions)
State v. Rosales, 205 Ariz. 86 (App. 2003) (preclusion rules prevent multiple reviews but not review entirely in unusual cases)