475 P.3d 558
Ariz.2020Background
- On December 11, 2014, Allyn Smith drove K.L. and her two‑month‑old daughter K.S. to a hiking trail, shot K.L. in the back of the head (killing her) and shot K.S. in the thigh (infant survived). Smith was later convicted of first‑degree murder and child abuse and sentenced to death; this is the automatic direct appeal.
- CSLI from AT&T placed Smith near K.L.’s apartment around 12:16 p.m. and within a mile‑and‑a‑half radius of the crime scene between 1:29–2:04 p.m.; Smith purchased a .22 handgun that morning and deleted Facebook accounts before meeting K.L.
- Immediately after the shooting Smith went to DES and submitted to a paternity test; the jury found two aggravators: (F)(2) serious offense (child abuse of K.S.) and (F)(5) pecuniary gain (murder to avoid child support).
- Smith moved to suppress his CSLI under Carpenter; the trial court denied suppression, finding probable cause or applying the good‑faith exception and concluding notice under §13‑3016 was timely (delay authorized and disclosed within 90 days).
- Other contested issues on appeal included admissibility/reliability of a single‑photo pretrial ID, Batson strikes of two African‑American jurors, admissibility and presentation of a CSLI movement video, limits on cross‑examination of Detective Udd, pecuniary‑gain sufficiency, jury instruction/mitigation questions, and whether an impasse instruction coerced the death verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Smith) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suppression of CSLI / warrant requirement | CSLI was obtained via IA Court order under §13‑3016; if Carpenter applies, evidence still admissible under good‑faith reliance on statute/order | Carpenter requires a warrant; §13‑3016 unconstitutional as applied; lack of prior notice | Court applied the good‑faith exception to admit CSLI; IA Court order not recast as warrant but PPD reasonably relied on statute; notice delay was authorized and disclosure occurred within 90 days. |
| Is IA Court order a functional equivalent of a warrant? | Order contained probable‑cause language and therefore was the functional equivalent of a warrant | Order was issued under reasonable‑grounds standard and was not a warrant | Court declined to treat the order as a warrant (it was an order), but still admitted CSLI under good‑faith exception. |
| Pretrial single‑photo ID of roommate (Dessureault) | Identification reliable: witness had recent view, bright room, attention, certainty; admissible despite single photo | Single‑photo showup was inherently suggestive and unreliable | Court found procedure inherently suggestive but reliable under Biggers factors (opportunity, attention, certainty, short delay) and admitted ID. |
| Batson challenge to peremptory strikes of two Black jurors | Strikes based on race‑neutral reasons: juror reluctant about death penalty; juror medical scheduling/migraines | Strikes were pretextual and racially motivated | Trial court credited prosecutor’s race‑neutral explanations; appellate court deferred to credibility findings and denied Batson. |
| Admissibility of CSLI movement video / PowerPoint | Video aids jury understanding of cell‑tower data; testimony warned jurors about CSLI imprecision | Video misleading: CSLI only gives ~1.5‑mile radius and cannot trace exact paths; prejudicial | Admissible; any imprecision goes to weight not admissibility; detective clarified limits and jury was instructed. |
| Cross‑examination limits on Detective Udd re: demotion/charging | State allowed probing of Udd’s misconduct/timekeeping; limiting questions about county‑attorney charging decision was proper (speculation) | Exclusion prevented exposing potential bias/motive to testify favorably after demotion/declined charges | No Confrontation Clause violation: defense could probe PPD investigation and time theft; conjecture about charging leniency lacked foundation. |
| Sufficiency of (F)(5) pecuniary‑gain aggravator | Circumstantial proof: prior assault to end pregnancy, statements about avoiding support, missed DNA tests, trip to DES after murder — shows expectation of pecuniary gain | Evidence insufficient; uncertain paternity and killing did not guarantee avoiding legal support obligation | Substantial evidence supports (F)(5): jury could reasonably find murder committed in expectation of avoiding child‑support obligations. |
| Impasse instruction / coercion of death verdict | Court followed Rule 22.4, interviewed foreperson, reiterated jurors may take needed time; instruction appropriate | Impasse instruction coerced holdouts into capitulating; judge’s comments pressured jury | No abuse of discretion; court did not know numeric split, deliberation time was short, judge emphasized no time limit and not forcing verdict. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (historical CSLI implicates Fourth Amendment; generally requires a warrant)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good‑faith exception where officers reasonably rely on statute later held invalid)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent bars exclusionary rule)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (reliability governs admissibility of identification after suggestive procedure)
- Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (factors for evaluating reliability of eyewitness ID)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes; three‑step Batson framework)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (capital juries must consider any relevant mitigating evidence)
- Ring v. Arizona, 204 Ariz. 534 (2003) (death penalty findings by jury required; examples of structural error in capital cases)