447 P.3d 297
Ariz.2019Background
- In June 2011 Alan Champagne killed Brandi Hoffner (first‑degree) and Philmon Tapaha (jury convicted of second‑degree); Champagne also convicted of kidnapping Hoffner and concealment of bodies; sentenced to death for Hoffner’s murder.
- Witness Elise Garcia observed Tapaha shot, saw Champagne hold a gun, followed Champagne and Hoffner into a bedroom where Champagne strangled Hoffner with a cord while Garcia sat in the doorway; bodies were kept a week in Champagne’s apartment and later buried in a box found ~20 months later.
- Champagne sought a change of counsel shortly before trial, asserting conflicts (including an intended State Bar complaint); the trial court denied the request after inquiry and applying LaGrand factors.
- Multiple pretrial and trial evidentiary rulings: suppression of post‑indictment undercover statements (March 19) under the Sixth Amendment; admission of pre‑charging undercover statements; denial of rule‑of‑completeness admission for a March 19 snippet; limits on cross‑examining Garcia about mental‑health diagnoses; death‑eligibility and aggravator instructions (including (F)(6) especially cruel); mitigation evidence rulings (mother/sister excluded when they invoked Fifth Amendment); allowance of state mitigation rebuttal.
- Jury found three aggravators: serious prior offense (F)(2), especially cruel (F)(6), multiple homicides (F)(8); mitigation insufficient for leniency. Court affirmed convictions and death sentence on direct appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Champagne) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of motion to change counsel | Court properly balanced LaGrand factors and preserved defendant’s rights | Counsel–client conflict (Bar complaint; alleged sleeping) created actual conflict requiring substitution | Denial was not an abuse of discretion; no irreconcilable breakdown shown; LaGrand factors weighed against change |
| Jury voir dire/questionnaire re: parole (Question 78) | Jury ultimately received correct Simmons instruction that life carries no parole; voir dire language cured by penalty instructions | Voir dire/questionnaire suggested life might allow release after 25 years, violating Simmons due process rule | No Simmons error: final penalty instruction and counsel argument clarified parole ineligibility |
| Statements to undercover officer (Detective Egea) | Pre‑indictment statements admissible; post‑indictment (March 19) statements suppressed under Sixth Amendment; Miranda not required for undercover contact | All statements violated Miranda/Fifth and Sixth Amendment and should be suppressed; March 19 statement could be admitted under rule of completeness to contextualize earlier admission | Court admitted pre‑charging statements (no Miranda problem because undercover); excluded March 19 (Sixth Amendment attached on indictment); rule of completeness not applicable to separate conversation |
| Limitation on cross‑examination of Garcia about mental health | Court allowed broad inquiry into perception, drug use; excluded diagnosis evidence absent offer of proof linking diagnosis to perception/recall | Excluding diagnosis and meds hindered ability to impeach Garcia’s credibility and perception | No abuse of discretion: defense could probe substance use and perception; proponent failed to show diagnosis affected perception so Rule 403 exclusion appropriate |
| Voluntary intoxication instruction | Instruction correctly informed jurors that voluntary intoxication is not a defense (statutory law) | Instruction improperly presented an affirmative defense the defense did not assert and prejudiced Champagne | No error: instruction was supported by evidence of meth use and properly stated the law (A.R.S. §13‑503) |
| Supplemental closing after jury question on felony murder | Supplemental argument to clarify felony murder was an appropriate, non‑coercive response to jury confusion | Supplemental argument improperly invaded jury province and prejudiced defense | Court did not abuse discretion; even if error it was harmless beyond reasonable doubt |
| Validity and narrowing of (F)(6) aggravator | (F)(6) may be narrowed by judicial instruction to require consciousness and defendant’s knowledge; proper instruction was given | (F)(6) is unconstitutionally vague and judicial narrowing violates separation of powers | (F)(6) upheld as constitutional when instruction required victim consciousness and defendant knowing/should have known of suffering |
| Excluding mother/sister mitigation testimony after they asserted Fifth Amendment | State permitted counsel for them; court excluded their testimony because they would selectively invoke the Fifth on cross‑examination, undermining reliability | Exclusion denied Champagne full mitigation presentation and compulsory process | No abuse: court reasonably found witnesses would invoke privilege to all relevant cross questions and allowed mitigation through other witnesses |
Key Cases Cited
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (due process requires jury be told of parole ineligibility when future dangerousness is at issue)
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (undercover officer conversations not subject to Miranda because no police‑dominated atmosphere)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense‑specific)
- Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (continuing investigation of uncharged offenses does not violate Sixth Amendment right to counsel)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercive police activity is required to render a confession involuntary under due process)
- Tucker, State v., 215 Ariz. 298 (2007) (F(6) aggravator facially vague but constitutionally salvageable by jury instructions requiring victim consciousness and defendant’s knowledge)
- Cromwell, State v., 211 Ariz. 181 (2005) (abuse of discretion review for denial of counsel substitution; defendant not entitled to counsel of choice)
- LaGrand, State v., 152 Ariz. 483 (1986) (factors trial courts should weigh when ruling on motions to change counsel)
- Moody, State v., 192 Ariz. 505 (1998) (irreconcilable conflict or fractured relationship with counsel requires reversal)