State of Arizona Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Hrach Shilgevorkyan
234 Ariz. 343
| Ariz. | 2014Background
- AR.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) makes it unlawful to drive with any drug or its metabolite in the body; question whether ‘its metabolite’ includes Carboxy-THC.
- Shilgevorkyan was stopped for speeding; blood test revealed Carboxy-THC and he admitted marijuana use; A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) and (A)(1) charged.
- The trial court dismissed the (A)(3) charge; the superior court affirmed the dismissal, and the court of appeals granted relief for the State via special action.
- Arizona Supreme Court held the phrase is ambiguous; held that ‘metabolite’ is limited to impairing metabolites, so Carboxy-THC is not an impairment-causing metabolite.
- The majority vacated the court of appeals and affirmed dismissal of the (A)(3) charge; the dissent argued the statute has a plain meaning and could be a zero-tolerance ban.
- Amid the decision, the AMMA and other potential applications were discussed to illustrate potential constitutional concerns under broader readings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ‘its metabolite’ in § 28-1381(A)(3) include non-impairing metabolites? | Shilgevorkyan: singular implies only primary metabolite; includes Carboxy-THC as a metabolite. | State: plural reading or broad interpretation includes all metabolites that trace to the drug. | Ambiguous; term susceptible to multiple readings. |
| Should the term be read to penalize any metabolite under a zero-tolerance framework? | State seeks broad prohibition regardless of impairment duration or effect. | Shilgevorkyan: legislature intended to penalize impairment, not mere presence of non-impairing metabolites. | Not adopted; the statute targets impairment-related metabolites only. |
| What interpretive approach governs § 28-1381(A)(3) given ambiguity? | State argues for broad construction to effectuate public safety. | Court should avoid absurd results and rely on context, history, and purpose. | Ambiguity resolved using secondary rules; statute interpreted to limit to impairing metabolites. |
| Does the majority interpretation align with legislative history and statutory scheme? | State: the aim is to prevent impaired driving; broad metabolite ban supports deterrence. | Dissent: plain meaning supports a broad flat ban if possible. | Majority reading aligns with preventing impairment; but Carboxy-THC not impairing yields dismissal of (A)(3) here. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hammonds, 192 Ariz. 528 (App. 1998) (A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) interpreted broadly to effectuate DUI statutes)
- State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368 (App. 1994) (Impairment-based analysis of drug DUI; discusses broad interpretation)
- State v. Cooperman, 232 Ariz. 347 (2013) (Discusses per se DUI framework and impairment considerations)
- Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Brain, 234 Ariz. 322 (2014) (Uses statutory interpretation principles in public-statute context)
- State v. Boyd, 201 Ariz. 27 (App. 2001) (Applied vagueness/interpretation considerations in applied contexts)
- Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212 Ariz. 255 (2006) (Discusses ambiguity and interpretation of broad statutory language)