State of Alabama v. Steven Thomason
687 F. App'x 874
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- In Oct. 2014 the Alabama Home Builders Licensure Board charged Steven Thomason under Ala. Code § 34-14A-14 for residential home building without a license after a homeowner complaint.
- Thomason was convicted in Elmore County District Court on Jan. 20, 2015, received a suspended 10-day sentence, probation, and a fine, and appealed for de novo review in Elmore County Circuit Court.
- Thomason filed a federal notice of removal in May 2015 and the district court sua sponte remanded, finding criminal-removal rules (28 U.S.C. § 1455) controlled and the notice untimely.
- In June 2016 Thomason filed a second removal notice relying chiefly on 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), arguing his § 1981 contract rights were denied (including claims of racial discrimination by the Board and various procedural/factual defects).
- The district court again remanded, finding (1) § 34-14A-14 is facially neutral and Thomason failed Rachel’s two-part test under § 1443(1), and (2) the second notice failed § 1455(b)(2)’s procedural requirement.
- On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Thomason did not show a firm prediction that he could not enforce § 1981 rights in state court and separately noting the procedural defect as an independent basis for remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) is proper | Thomason: § 1981 protects his right to make/enforce contracts and the Elmore prosecution denies/enforces infringement of that right, including alleged racial discrimination by the Board | State (and district court): § 34-14A-14 is facially neutral; Thomason did not show he cannot enforce § 1981 rights in state court per Rachel test | Held: No. Thomason failed Rachel’s two-part test; no firm prediction state court will deny § 1981 rights, so § 1443(1) removal not available |
| Whether allegations of corruption, bias, lack of probable cause, or preclusion permit § 1443(1) removal | Thomason: Board influence, corrupt court, false evidence, lack of probable cause, prior dismissal in Montgomery justify federal removal | State: Such allegations alone do not show a denial of a racially-stated federal right required by § 1443(1) | Held: Allegations insufficient; City of Greenwood and Rachel foreclose removal on these grounds |
| Whether constitutional (Contract Clause) or other federal defenses make case removable | Thomason: § 34-14A-14 violates Contract Clause; federal defenses justify removal | State: Broad constitutional or preclusion defenses are not rights "stated in terms of racial equality" required by § 1443(1) | Held: Contract Clause claim does not satisfy § 1443(1); may be raised in state court but not a basis for removal |
| Whether Thomason’s second notice satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(2) procedural requirements | Thomason: second notice permissible (argued generally removal was appropriate) | State: § 1455(b)(2) allows a second notice only on new grounds not existing at time of original notice; Thomason’s new grounds existed earlier | Held: Independently dispositive — second notice failed § 1455(b)(2), so remand proper on procedural grounds as well |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (establishes two-part test for § 1443(1) removal)
- City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (recognizes § 1981 and related statutes qualify under § 1443(1))
- Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (explains when state prosecutions can deny civil-rights protections despite facially neutral laws)
- Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir.) (applies Rachel framework within this circuit)
- Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773 (discusses de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction after removal)