State Natl Bank of Big Spring v. Jacob Lew, 417 App. D.C. 311

After the 2008–09 financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd‑Frank Act, creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), and an "orderly liquidation authority" for certain failing financial firms.
State National Bank (a Texas bank) and several States sued in D.C. District Court challenging multiple Dodd‑Frank provisions as unconstitutional: the CFPB’s structure and delegated authority, the legality of Richard Cordray’s recess appointment as CFPB Director, FSOC’s designation powers, and the Government’s orderly liquidation authority.
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing and ripeness; plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
The Bank is regulated by the CFPB and alleges concrete compliance costs (e.g., implementing the Remittance Rule). The Bank also alleges competitive harms from FSOC designations of large firms like GE Capital.
The State plaintiffs (eleven States and pension funds) claim that orderly liquidation authority may reduce the value of their bond investments by allowing the government to alter creditor priorities in future liquidations.
The appellate court reviews standing and ripeness de novo and considers each of the four challenges separately.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of CFPB structure and delegation	CFPB is unconstitutional because independent agencies must be multi‑member and because Congress over‑delegated authority	Dodd‑Frank lawfully created CFPB and delegation is permissible	Bank has standing and claim is ripe; remanded for District Court to decide the merits
Lawfulness of Cordray’s recess appointment	Cordray’s intra‑session recess appointment was unlawful; acts taken during that period are invalid	Appointment was permissible / later Senate confirmation cures defects	Bank has standing and claim is ripe; remanded for merits in light of Noel Canning; District Court to consider effect of later confirmation
Constitutionality of FSOC designation authority	FSOC’s power to designate "too big to fail" firms injures Bank (competitive harm) and is an unconstitutional delegation/separation issue	FSOC’s actions do not directly injure the Bank; any competitive effect is speculative and attenuated	Bank lacks standing to challenge FSOC designation authority; affirm dismissal
Constitutionality of orderly liquidation authority	Authority to alter creditor priority harms States and pension funds by reducing present value of their investments; violates Bankruptcy Clause, non‑delegation, and due process	Injury is speculative and contingent on future liquidation events; claim is not ripe	States lack standing and claim is not ripe; affirm dismissal

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (discusses multi‑member independent agency precedents)
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (articulates non‑delegation principles)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements for injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability)
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness and pre‑enforcement challenges to agency rules)
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (pre‑enforcement review of constitutionality of regulatory agencies)
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (limits on the President’s recess appointment power)
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (attenuation and causation limits on standing arising from third‑party regulation)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (standing and ripeness overlap in pre‑enforcement constitutional challenges)