STATE IN the INTEREST OF D.M., a Juvenile
207 A.3d 250
N.J.2019Background
- 14-year-old D.M. was charged in juvenile court with conduct constituting first-degree aggravated sexual assault for alleged acts against 11-year-old Z.Y.; the court also considered the lesser charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)).
- At trial the court found Z.Y. credible and detailed acts (exposure, requests for oral contact, physical contact with buttocks), but concluded the State did not prove sexual penetration beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court nevertheless adjudicated D.M. delinquent under the endangering statute, finding he engaged in "sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child."
- At disposition the court stated, contradictorily, that the elements of first-degree sexual assault had been met but that it downgraded the adjudication to endangering "as a humanitarian gesture" based on D.M.'s personal circumstances.
- The Appellate Division reversed, holding the endangering statute should not reach close-in-age juvenile sexual conduct absent penetration, force, or coercion; the Supreme Court granted certification.
- The Supreme Court (majority) held the plain text of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) does not incorporate penetration, force, or age-disparity elements from the sexual-offense statutes, but reversed D.M.'s adjudication because the trial court's contradictory disposition comments undermined confidence in its factfindings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) requires proof of penetration, force/coercion, or age disparity for juvenile adjudication | State: statute's plain language requires only (1) child victim and (2) sexual conduct that would impair or debauch morals; no cross-reference to sexual-assault provisions | D.M.: endangering must be read with sexual-offense statutes to avoid criminalizing close-in-age consensual juvenile conduct; rule of lenity favors defendant | Court: statute's plain language does not import penetration, force, or age-disparity elements; endangering may apply to close-in-age juveniles in appropriate cases, but legislative clarification would be helpful |
| Whether the Family Part's disposition remarks affected the validity of adjudication | State: adjudication supported by judge's written factfindings; disposition comments should not undermine adjudication | D.M.: disposition comments reveal adjudication was improperly "downgraded" for humanitarian reasons | Court: disposition remarks contradicted the written adjudication, undermining confidence in which facts were actually found; reversal required |
| Whether the Appellate Division properly raised and decided a new statutory-construction issue sua sponte without oral argument | State: panel should have granted oral argument after expanding the issue | Appellate panel (implicit): sua sponte query expanded the appeal | Court: appellate courts should seriously consider granting oral argument when they expand issues; state should have been allowed argument though outcome resolved on other grounds |
| Need for statutory guidance or legislative reform | State/AG: current statutory text governs; clarity would help | D.M./Concurrence: statute is vague and risks criminalizing consensual close-in-age juvenile conduct; limits should be read in | Court: urged legislative review to clarify "sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child" though did not judicially rewrite the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) (statutory interpretation principles and reliance on legislative intent)
- State v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540 (2003) ("sexual conduct" in endangering statute includes sexual assault and sexual contact)
- State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) (appellate standard of review for trial judge factual findings)
- Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) (no deference to trial court's legal interpretation)
- State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320 (2011) (when statutory language is unambiguous, extrinsic aids are unnecessary)
- In re Expungement of the Arrest/Charge Records of T.B., 236 N.J. 262 (2019) (declining to excise offenses from statute where Legislature did not do so)