State in the Interest of K.O., a Minor (070406)
85 A.3d 938
| N.J. | 2014Background
- Kyle committed a present offense adjudicated in 2009 which, if committed by an adult, would be first- or second-degree robbery.
- Prior adjudications include April 2007 (disturbing the peace) and August 2007 (fourth-degree riot) with no detention commitments.
- March 2008 adjudication for second-degree aggravated assault led to a 24-month custodial term at NJ Training School.
- September 2008 recall and JISP placement occurred but Kyle failed to complete, resulting in termination of JISP and discharge in early 2009.
- In March 2009 Kyle’s current delinquency act led to a disposition hearing where extended-term status under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) was sought.
- Appellate Division affirmed the extended-term; the Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute requires two prior predicate adjudications, excluding the present offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two prior adjudications | Kyle argues two previous predicate adjudications are required. | State argues the present offense may count as a predicate if two separate qualifying offenses exist. | Two separate prior adjudications required; present offense cannot count. |
| If ambiguity exists, should lenity apply | N/A (Kyle seeks lenity due to ambiguous text) | N/A | Lenity applied to resolve ambiguity in favor of Kyle. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re K.O., 424 N.J. Super. 555 (App.Div.2012) (two prior separate predicate offenses required, one including incarceration; current offense not counted)
- State ex rel. R.M., 141 N.J. 434 (1995) (discusses recall/removal opportunities in disposition)
- State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000) (punishment and rehabilitation balance in juvenile justice)
- State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456 (2003) (Code purposes include accountability and public protection)
- Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142 (2013) (statutory interpretation and ordinary meaning of language)
- State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500 (2013) (lenity applicable to ambiguous criminal statutes)
- State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008) (lenity principle in criminal statute interpretation)
- DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid superfluous language)
- Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251 (2008) (interpretation in context of statutory scheme)
- Hendricks v. State, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Huber (2013) (statutory language given ordinary meaning)